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Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Rational expectations, money announcements, and the bond market

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Sargent and Wallace have argued that the natural rate hypothesis combined with rational expectations eradicates the standard effects of monetary policy, unless the central monetary authority holds an information advantage over the general public. In defining rational expectations, John Muth wrote that "public predictions" or announcements do not affect markets since no new information is provided. This paper examines the question of whether money supply announcements provide new information to the bond market, suggesting a possible information advantage on the part of the Federal Reserve Board. Methodology originally used in connection with "causality" testing is utilized after comparing two different forms of the test. Evidence suggesting that money announcements do provide new information leads to questions concerning the time structure of the advantage, which are then tested.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Arts
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Economics
Department dc:contributor.department
Economics
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Year dc:date.issued
1982

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Larson, Donald F.

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10919/80121
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/80121

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Larson, Donald F.. Rational expectations, money announcements, and the bond market. masters thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1982. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/80121