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Virginia Tech

Software Protection Against Fault and Side Channel Attacks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Embedded systems are increasingly ubiquitous. Many of them have security requirements such as smart cards, mobile phones, and internet connected appliances. It can be a challenge to fulfill security requirements due to the constrained nature of embedded devices. This security challenge is worsened by the possibility of implementation attacks. Despite well formulated cryptosystems being used, the underlying hardware can often undermine any security proven on paper. If a secret key is at play, an adversary has a chance of revealing it by simply looking at the power variation. Additionally, an adversary can tamper with an embedded system's environment to get it to skip a security check or generate side channel information. Any adversary with physical access to an embedded system can conduct such implementation attacks. It is the focus of this work to explore different countermeasures against both side channel and fault attacks. A new countermeasure call Intra-instruction Redundancy, based on bit-slicing, or N-bit SIMD processing, is proposed. Another challenge with implementing countermeasures against implementation attacks, is that they need to be able to be combined. Most proposed side channel countermeasures do not prevent fault injection and vice versa. Combining them is non-trivial as demonstrated with a combined implementation attack.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Engineering
Department dc:contributor.department
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Patrick, Conor Persson
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Schaumont, Patrick R.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Nazhandali, Leyla
  • Gerdes, Ryan M.

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
vt_gsexam:12281
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/78685

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Patrick, Conor Persson. Software Protection Against Fault and Side Channel Attacks. masters thesis, Virginia Tech, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78685