{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/78282"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/78282","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic Substantivalism","abstract":"Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate.","abstract_html":"Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Davis, Cruz Austin"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"committee_members":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-06-29","date_published":"2017-06-29","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:19:12Z","subjects":["Substantivalism","supersubstantivalism","material objects","theoretic virtues","ideological parsimony","geometric possibility","principle of plenitude"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11736"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:11736","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78282","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Davis, Cruz Austin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2017-06-30T08:00:19Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-06-30T08:00:19Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2017-06-29"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Substantivalism","supersubstantivalism","material objects","theoretic virtues","ideological parsimony","geometric possibility","principle of plenitude"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11736"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78282"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstractgeneral","label":"General Abstract","values":["You, I, a rock on the ground, electrons, and galaxies all have something in common: we are all material objects. Material objects are often defined as the things that have locations within spacetime. But what is it to have a location within spacetime? Some authors, monists, believe that to have a location in spacetime is to be no more than a bit of the spatiotemporal manifold. Others, dualists, think of spacetime like a box that objects get placed into. For them having a location is to “take up” part of the room in this box. As the debate currently stands, many philosophical considerations look to point in favor of monism over dualism. In this paper I discuss a novel argument that this assessment does not stand up to scrutiny. The argument makes use of contemporary theories in physics and advanced geometry to argue that distinct parts of spacetime can be located at one another. This is shown to undermine many of the considerations which are thought to favor monism over dualism."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic Substantivalism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Davis, Cruz Austin"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2017-06-30T08:00:19Z"],"dc:date.available":["2017-06-30T08:00:19Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2017-06-29"],"dc:description.abstract":["Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. 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In this paper I discuss a novel argument that this assessment does not stand up to scrutiny. The argument makes use of contemporary theories in physics and advanced geometry to argue that distinct parts of spacetime can be located at one another. This is shown to undermine many of the considerations which are thought to favor monism over dualism."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:11736"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78282"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Substantivalism","supersubstantivalism","material objects","theoretic virtues","ideological parsimony","geometric possibility","principle of plenitude"],"dc:title":["Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic Substantivalism"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:19:12Z"}