{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/78011"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/78011","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation","abstract":"While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.","abstract_html":"While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to &#x27;what is &lt;i&gt;scientific&lt;/i&gt; explanation?&#x27;, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to &#x27;what is scientific &lt;i&gt;explanation&lt;/i&gt;?&#x27; In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Taylor, Kaetlin Diane"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Patton, Lydia K."],"committee_members":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-06-09","date_published":"2017-06-09","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:19:09Z","subjects":["Philosophy of Science","Explanation","Ontic Explanation","Epistemic Explanation"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11115"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:11115","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78011","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Patton, Lydia K."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Taylor, Kaetlin Diane"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2017-06-10T08:01:24Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-06-10T08:01:24Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2017-06-09"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy of Science","Explanation","Ontic Explanation","Epistemic Explanation"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:11115"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78011"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstractgeneral","label":"General Abstract","values":["While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Patton, Lydia K."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Taylor, Kaetlin Diane"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2017-06-10T08:01:24Z"],"dc:date.available":["2017-06-10T08:01:24Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2017-06-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is <i>scientific</i> explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific <i>explanation</i>?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other."],"dc:description.abstractgeneral":["While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to ‘what is scientific explanation?’, while Railton was focused on a question more similar to ‘what is scientific explanation?’. In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:11115"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78011"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy of Science","Explanation","Ontic Explanation","Epistemic Explanation"],"dc:title":["The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific Explanation"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:19:09Z"}