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Virginia Tech

Moral Authority as Moral Skill: An Exemplarist Theory of Practical Justification

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

How should we understand the question "Why be moral?" Can we answer this question? If so, how? In this paper I develop an exemplarist theory of practical moral justification; that is, a theory of the justification of the prima facie moral things that we do, not the moral beliefs that we have. I take as my starting point that morality is, essentially, a set of practices in which all persons, in virtue of their being persons, participate. I argue that skillful practitioners of these various practices should be understood as moral authorities, and that the appeal to a moral authority for the purpose of one's justifying one's moral doings is necessarily justified for the appealer whenever she is practicing the same practice as the moral authority. This theory holds that moral authorities, so circumscribed, are Authoritative Exemplars, and as the appeal to their authority is necessarily justified they are able to provide a foundation for practical moral justifications, and thus rebutting the objection that all such justifications will run to regress. Among other things this account allows us to interpret the "Why be moral?" question as a question asking for more than can be had posed from a position of misunderstanding the nature of morality and practical moral justification. We cannot answer the "Why be moral?" question any more than we can answer the "Why be human?" question.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Arts
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lindsey, Johnathan Matthew
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Pitt, Joseph C.
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Parent, Ted
  • Moehler, Michael

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
vt_gsexam:7803
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/75224

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lindsey, Johnathan Matthew. Moral Authority as Moral Skill: An Exemplarist Theory of Practical Justification. masters thesis, Virginia Tech, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/75224