{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/71743"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/71743","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Substance of Ontological Disputes","abstract":"There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes.","abstract_html":"There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lamb, Richard Campbell"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"committee_members":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-07-06","date_published":"2016-07-06","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:56:14Z","subjects":["metametaphysics","ontology","verbal disputes","ontological realism"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:8117"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:8117","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71743","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lamb, Richard Campbell"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2016-07-07T08:00:20Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2016-07-07T08:00:20Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2016-07-06"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["metametaphysics","ontology","verbal disputes","ontological realism"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:8117"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71743"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Substance of Ontological Disputes"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Jantzen, Benjamin C.","Klagge, James C."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Lamb, Richard Campbell"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2016-07-07T08:00:20Z"],"dc:date.available":["2016-07-07T08:00:20Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2016-07-06"],"dc:description.abstract":["There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:8117"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71743"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["metametaphysics","ontology","verbal disputes","ontological realism"],"dc:title":["The Substance of Ontological Disputes"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:56:14Z"}