Trustworthy Embedded Computing for Cyber-Physical Control

A cyber-physical controller (CPC) uses computing to control a physical process. Example CPCs can be found in self-driving automobiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other autonomous systems. They are also used in large-scale industrial control systems (ICSs) manufacturing and utility infrastructure. CPC operations rely on embedded systems having real-time, high-assurance interactions with physical processes. However, recent attacks like Stuxnet have demonstrated that CPC malware is not restricted to networks and general-purpose computers, rather embedded components are targeted as well. General-purpose computing and network approaches to security are failing to protect embedded controllers, which can have the direct effect of process disturbance or destruction. Moreover, as embedded systems increasingly grow in capability and find application in CPCs, embedded leaf node security is gaining priority. This work develops a root-of-trust design architecture, which provides process resilience to cyber attacks on, or from, embedded controllers: the Trustworthy Autonomic Interface Guardian Architecture (TAIGA). We define five trust requirements for building a fine-grained trusted computing component. TAIGA satisfies all requirements and addresses all classes of CPC attacks using an approach distinguished by adding resilience to the embedded controller, rather than seeking to prevent attacks from ever reaching the controller. TAIGA provides an on-chip, digital, security version of classic mechanical interlocks. This last line of defense monitors all of the communications of a controller using configurable or external hardware that is inaccessible to the controller processor. The interface controller is synthesized from C code, formally analyzed, and permits run-time checked, authenticated updates to certain system parameters but not code. TAIGA overrides any controller actions that are inconsistent with system specifications, including prediction and preemption of latent malwares attempts to disrupt system stability and safety. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Number CNS-1222656. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We are grateful for donations from Xilinx, Inc. and support from the Georgia Tech Research Institute.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph. D.

Level thesis:degree_level

doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Computer Engineering

Department dc:contributor.department

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2015

Author dc:creator

• Lerner, Lee Wilmoth

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Patterson, Cameron D.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Shukla, Sandeep K.
• Yao, Danfeng (Daphne)
• Schaumont, Patrick R.
• Park, Jung-Min

• Trustworthy Computing
• Secure Computing
• Autonomic Computing
• Cybersecurity
• Embedded Systems
• Cyber-Physical Systems
• Process Control Systems

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Dc Identifier Other

vt_gsexam:4566

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/51545