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Virginia Tech

Situated Cognition, Dynamicism, and Explanation in Cognitive Science

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The majority of cognitive scientists today view the mind as a computer, instantiating some function mapping the inputs it gets from the environment to the gross behaviors of the organism. As a result, the emphasis in most ongoing research programmes is on finding that function, or some part of that function. Moreover, the types of functions considered are limited somewhat by the preconception that the mind must be instantiating a function that can be expressed as a computer program. I argue that research done in the last two decades suggests that we should approach cognition with as much consideration to the environment as to the inner workings of the mind. Our cognition is often shaped by the constraints the environment places on us, not just by the "inputs" we receive from it. I argue also that there is a new approach to cognitive science, viewing the mind not as a computer but as a dynamical system, which captures the shift in perspective while eliminating the requirement that cognitive functions be expressable as computer programs. Unfortunately, some advocates of this dynamical perspective have argued that we should replace all of traditional psychology and neuroscience with their new approach. In response to these advocates, I argue that we cannot develop an adequate dynamical picture of the mind without engaging in precisely those sorts of research and hypothesizing that traditional neuroscience and psychology engage in. In short, I argue that we require certain types of explanations in order to get our dynamical (or computational) theories off the ground, and we cannot get those from other dynamical (or computational) theories.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Arts
Level thesis:degree_level
masters
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Philosophy
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
1998

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Greenlee, Christopher Alan
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Hardcastle, Valerie Gray
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Roach, John W.
  • Miller, Harlan B.

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
etd-63098-193132
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/46501

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Greenlee, Christopher Alan. Situated Cognition, Dynamicism, and Explanation in Cognitive Science. masters thesis, Virginia Tech, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/46501