{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/44501"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/44501","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Autonomy and neutrality in liberal political thought","abstract":"A central tenet of liberal political philosophy is the claim that the role of the state is to remain neutral among citizens’ varying conceptions of the good life. In addition to this tenet, some liberals hold the view that we ought to define freedom as individual autonomy. Moreover, such liberals claim that the state is required to promote and protect freedom conceived of as individual autonomy. Such autonomy-based liberalism is frequently criticized for its efforts to simultaneously maintain both views—that is, a commitment both the value of autonomy and a neutrality condition. Critics often argue that since any substantive normative commitment conflicts with the demands neutrality and commitment to the value of autonomy is a substantive normative commitment, liberals cannot consistently be committed to both a neutrality condition and the value of autonomy. This thesis is concerned with providing the best interpretation of liberalism’s theoretical commitments in a way that is consistent with valuing both autonomy and neutrality.","abstract_html":"A central tenet of liberal political philosophy is the claim that the role of the state is to remain neutral among citizens’ varying conceptions of the good life. In addition to this tenet, some liberals hold the view that we ought to define freedom as individual autonomy. Moreover, such liberals claim that the state is required to promote and protect freedom conceived of as individual autonomy. Such autonomy-based liberalism is frequently criticized for its efforts to simultaneously maintain both views—that is, a commitment both the value of autonomy and a neutrality condition. Critics often argue that since any substantive normative commitment conflicts with the demands neutrality and commitment to the value of autonomy is a substantive normative commitment, liberals cannot consistently be committed to both a neutrality condition and the value of autonomy. This thesis is concerned with providing the best interpretation of liberalism’s theoretical commitments in a way that is consistent with valuing both autonomy and neutrality.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Watson, Paula L."],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Christman, John"],"committee_members":["Croskery, Patrick","White, Stephen"],"year":1996,"date_issued":"1996","date_published":"1996","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:25Z","subjects":["liberalism","perfectionism","conceptions of the good"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-08292008-063504"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd-08292008-063504","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/44501","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Christman, John"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Croskery, Patrick","White, Stephen"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Watson, Paula L."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-03-14T21:44:03Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-03-14T21:44:03Z","2008-08-29"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1996"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.dcmitype","label":"Dc Type Dcmitype","values":["Text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["liberalism","perfectionism","conceptions of the good"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-08292008-063504"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/44501"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["A central tenet of liberal political philosophy is the claim that the role of the state is to remain neutral among citizens’ varying conceptions of the good life. 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