{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/43909"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/43909","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Scientific Realism and the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements","abstract":"The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables.","abstract_html":"The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sides, Jonathan David"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Burian, Richard M."],"committee_members":["Pitt, Joseph C.","Perini, Laura"],"year":2006,"date_issued":"2006-07-13","date_published":"2006-07-13","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:05Z","subjects":["Philosophy of science","scientific theories","scientific realism","periodic table"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-07252006-231659"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd-07252006-231659","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/43909","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Burian, Richard M."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Pitt, Joseph C.","Perini, Laura"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sides, Jonathan David"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-03-14T21:41:11Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-03-14T21:41:11Z","2008-09-14"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2006-07-13"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy of science","scientific theories","scientific realism","periodic table"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-07252006-231659"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/43909"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Scientific Realism and the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Burian, Richard M."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Pitt, Joseph C.","Perini, Laura"],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Sides, Jonathan David"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-03-14T21:41:11Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-03-14T21:41:11Z","2008-09-14"],"dc:date.issued":["2006-07-13"],"dc:description.abstract":["The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:identifier.other":["etd-07252006-231659"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/43909"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy of science","scientific theories","scientific realism","periodic table"],"dc:title":["Scientific Realism and the Periodic Table of Chemical Elements"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:05Z"}