{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/33483"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/33483","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Quality Incentives and the Development of High-value Agrifood Markets: Ecuador's Cacao Marketing Chain","abstract":"This thesis explores constraints to the development of markets for high quality cacao in Ecuador. It focuses on the role of market level constraints, particularly the transmission of quality incentives along the marketing chain and their effects on farmers' incentives to invest in quality production. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the problem, demonstrating that Ecuadorian farmers are not responding to international incentives to produce high quality cacao, and outlines the objectives, hypotheses, and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides background to the market, detailing Ecuador's role in world commodity and high-value cacao markets and gives a detailed description of the cacao market in Ecuador. Chapter 3 uses a subsector analysis to develop and test hypotheses that specific market level constraints, such as transaction costs, market power, and institutional constraints, impede the transmission of incentives to produce quality to farmers. The subsector analysis failed to support the hypotheses that intermediaries are able to exert market power but found that transaction costs and weak institutions presented significant constraints to the transmission of quality incentives. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of farmers' market channel choice and the prices that they receive. In addition to determinants that are commonly found in the literature, such as the characteristics of the transaction and farmer's characteristics, hypotheses testing of quality incentives makes a unique contribution. Analysis of survey data of Ecuadorian farmers found minimal transmission of quality incentives to farmers—only the cultivar Nacional as a quality indicator was found to affect the farmers' market channel choice out of six indicators selected to represent quality. The quality indicators selected were pre- and post-harvest practices, variety, having received technical assistance, credit, belonging to a cacao association, and discounts at sale by the buyer. Also, pre- and post-harvest practices, having received credit, and belonging to a cacao association out of similar quality indicators were found to affect the price paid to the farmer. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main points discovered through the research, discusses policy implications, and proposes further research needs.","abstract_html":"This thesis explores constraints to the development of markets for high quality cacao in Ecuador. It focuses on the role of market level constraints, particularly the transmission of quality incentives along the marketing chain and their effects on farmers' incentives to invest in quality production. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the problem, demonstrating that Ecuadorian farmers are not responding to international incentives to produce high quality cacao, and outlines the objectives, hypotheses, and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides background to the market, detailing Ecuador's role in world commodity and high-value cacao markets and gives a detailed description of the cacao market in Ecuador. Chapter 3 uses a subsector analysis to develop and test hypotheses that specific market level constraints, such as transaction costs, market power, and institutional constraints, impede the transmission of incentives to produce quality to farmers. The subsector analysis failed to support the hypotheses that intermediaries are able to exert market power but found that transaction costs and weak institutions presented significant constraints to the transmission of quality incentives. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of farmers' market channel choice and the prices that they receive. In addition to determinants that are commonly found in the literature, such as the characteristics of the transaction and farmer's characteristics, hypotheses testing of quality incentives makes a unique contribution. Analysis of survey data of Ecuadorian farmers found minimal transmission of quality incentives to farmers—only the cultivar Nacional as a quality indicator was found to affect the farmers' market channel choice out of six indicators selected to represent quality. The quality indicators selected were pre- and post-harvest practices, variety, having received technical assistance, credit, belonging to a cacao association, and discounts at sale by the buyer. Also, pre- and post-harvest practices, having received credit, and belonging to a cacao association out of similar quality indicators were found to affect the price paid to the farmer. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main points discovered through the research, discusses policy implications, and proposes further research needs.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jano, Pilar Alejandra"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Science","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Agricultural and Applied Economics","degree_department":"Agricultural and Applied Economics","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Mainville, Denise Y."],"committee_members":["Norton, George W.","Parmeter, Christopher F.","Taylor, Daniel B.","Alwang, Jeffrey R."],"year":2007,"date_issued":"2007-05-02","date_published":"2007-05-02","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:21Z","subjects":["Ecuador","quality","marketing chain","small farmers","market","cacao"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-06082007-131653"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd-06082007-131653","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/33483","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Mainville, Denise Y."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Norton, George W.","Parmeter, Christopher F.","Taylor, Daniel B.","Alwang, Jeffrey R."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Agricultural and Applied Economics"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jano, Pilar Alejandra"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-03-14T20:39:37Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-03-14T20:39:37Z","2007-07-27"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2007-05-02"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Agricultural and Applied Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Ecuador","quality","marketing chain","small farmers","market","cacao"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["etd-06082007-131653"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/33483"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis explores constraints to the development of markets for high quality cacao in Ecuador. It focuses on the role of market level constraints, particularly the transmission of quality incentives along the marketing chain and their effects on farmers' incentives to invest in quality production. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the problem, demonstrating that Ecuadorian farmers are not responding to international incentives to produce high quality cacao, and outlines the objectives, hypotheses, and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides background to the market, detailing Ecuador's role in world commodity and high-value cacao markets and gives a detailed description of the cacao market in Ecuador. Chapter 3 uses a subsector analysis to develop and test hypotheses that specific market level constraints, such as transaction costs, market power, and institutional constraints, impede the transmission of incentives to produce quality to farmers. The subsector analysis failed to support the hypotheses that intermediaries are able to exert market power but found that transaction costs and weak institutions presented significant constraints to the transmission of quality incentives. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of farmers' market channel choice and the prices that they receive. In addition to determinants that are commonly found in the literature, such as the characteristics of the transaction and farmer's characteristics, hypotheses testing of quality incentives makes a unique contribution. Analysis of survey data of Ecuadorian farmers found minimal transmission of quality incentives to farmers—only the cultivar Nacional as a quality indicator was found to affect the farmers' market channel choice out of six indicators selected to represent quality. The quality indicators selected were pre- and post-harvest practices, variety, having received technical assistance, credit, belonging to a cacao association, and discounts at sale by the buyer. Also, pre- and post-harvest practices, having received credit, and belonging to a cacao association out of similar quality indicators were found to affect the price paid to the farmer. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main points discovered through the research, discusses policy implications, and proposes further research needs."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Science"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Quality Incentives and the Development of High-value Agrifood Markets: Ecuador's Cacao Marketing Chain"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Mainville, Denise Y."],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Norton, George W.","Parmeter, Christopher F.","Taylor, Daniel B.","Alwang, Jeffrey R."],"dc:contributor.department":["Agricultural and Applied Economics"],"dc:creator":["Jano, Pilar Alejandra"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-03-14T20:39:37Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-03-14T20:39:37Z","2007-07-27"],"dc:date.issued":["2007-05-02"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis explores constraints to the development of markets for high quality cacao in Ecuador. It focuses on the role of market level constraints, particularly the transmission of quality incentives along the marketing chain and their effects on farmers' incentives to invest in quality production. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the problem, demonstrating that Ecuadorian farmers are not responding to international incentives to produce high quality cacao, and outlines the objectives, hypotheses, and structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides background to the market, detailing Ecuador's role in world commodity and high-value cacao markets and gives a detailed description of the cacao market in Ecuador. Chapter 3 uses a subsector analysis to develop and test hypotheses that specific market level constraints, such as transaction costs, market power, and institutional constraints, impede the transmission of incentives to produce quality to farmers. The subsector analysis failed to support the hypotheses that intermediaries are able to exert market power but found that transaction costs and weak institutions presented significant constraints to the transmission of quality incentives. Chapter 4 examines the determinants of farmers' market channel choice and the prices that they receive. In addition to determinants that are commonly found in the literature, such as the characteristics of the transaction and farmer's characteristics, hypotheses testing of quality incentives makes a unique contribution. Analysis of survey data of Ecuadorian farmers found minimal transmission of quality incentives to farmers—only the cultivar Nacional as a quality indicator was found to affect the farmers' market channel choice out of six indicators selected to represent quality. The quality indicators selected were pre- and post-harvest practices, variety, having received technical assistance, credit, belonging to a cacao association, and discounts at sale by the buyer. Also, pre- and post-harvest practices, having received credit, and belonging to a cacao association out of similar quality indicators were found to affect the price paid to the farmer. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main points discovered through the research, discusses policy implications, and proposes further research needs."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Science"],"dc:identifier.other":["etd-06082007-131653"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/33483"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Ecuador","quality","marketing chain","small farmers","market","cacao"],"dc:title":["Quality Incentives and the Development of High-value Agrifood Markets: Ecuador's Cacao Marketing Chain"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Agricultural and Applied Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:21Z"}