The 1993 North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Foreign Policy Analysis

In this paper I apply the Rational Actor model to the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. I begin with two hypotheses: 1) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because of its perception of threat from South Korea and the United States; 2) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because it wanted to use its nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the United States. I conduct a diplomatic historical analysis based on the Rational Actor model to determine which was North Korea's primary objective, and conclude that the primary objective of North Korea was obtaining economic concessions, but that threat perception did seem to play a role in the decision to start the nuclear program. In this process, I show that the Rational Actor model was insufficient in the analysis and that it must be complemented by cultural factors, "thickening" the rationality.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Political Science

Department dc:contributor.department

Political Science

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2000

Author dc:creator

• Lee, Ergene

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Weisband, Edward

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Borer, Douglas A.
• Corntassel, Jeffrey J.
• Luke, Timothy W.

• Nuclear Weapons
• NuclearProgram
• DPRK
• Track II Diplomacy
• Foreign Policy
• James Carter
• North Korea

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Dc Identifier Other

etd-06082000-11200042

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/33477