Morality in the Meat Machine

This thesis examines the excusing and exempting conditions in Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. More specifically, it notes some concerns for Strawsonian accounts with regards to exempting individuals on the basis of psychological abnormalities, namely that the excusing/exempting distinction is unclear, and more importantly that treating a person's brain as an entity distinct from the person suggests a dualistic picture of the self that is not consistent with neuroscientific accounts of the brain. If we redraw the distinction to be between external/internal features, and focus on brain processes as the responsible entities for any given action, we can avoid these worries and have a more empirically accurate account of responsibility.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2013

Author dc:creator

• Mccormack, Jessica L.

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Pitt, Joseph C.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Klagge, James C.
• Faraci, David
• Parent, Ted

• Moral Responsibility
• Neuroscience
• Strawson
• psychological disorders

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Dc Identifier Other

vt_gsexam:1169

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/23181