Testimonial Injustice and the Puzzle of Hearer Culpability

This paper identifies a puzzle in Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial injustice, the puzzle of hearer culpability: how is it possible for hearers to be culpable for beliefs they form on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices that regularly bypass conscious thought? In trying to solve this puzzle, I consider one way to hold hearers culpable despite stereotypes and prejudices bypassing conscious thought, that is, by focusing on the hearer's upstream epistemic practices. I then show that even factoring in upstream epistemic practices, there are cases where the speaker sustains testimonial injustice without the hearer being culpable. To account for these cases then I suggest redefining testimonial injustice in a way that recognizes the role of wider structural factors, and not just individual failings. I sketch a view of this structural dimension of testimonial injustice, drawing on our understanding of another kind of epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice. Taking account of this structural dimension, I then offer a richer account of hearer culpability, one that understands culpability to fall on a spectrum.

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts

Level thesis:degree_level

masters

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

Virginia Tech

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Agarwal, Yash

Chair dc:contributor.committeechair

• Parker, Wendy

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Yaure, Philip Christopher
• Sud, Rohan

• stereotype
• prejudice
• credibility
• culpability
• credence
• injustice
• social imaginary
• social power

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Language dc:language.iso

en

Dc Identifier Other

vt_gsexam:43002

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/125227