Abstract
dc:description.abstractGrounding and Naturalness have been two important concepts in the Metaphysician's toolbox. They are both used to cash out the notion of fundamentality; that is, proponents of both concepts propose certain criteria for counting a property/fact as more fundamental than another. In this paper, I will explore whether there is any plausible systematic connection between the criteria the two concepts offer for fundamentality and argue that there is none. In the end, I suggest that we should stick to one consistent use of naturalness first and then explore further which concept offer a better notion of fundamentality.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Arts
- Level thesis:degree_level
- masters
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Philosophy
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Virginia Tech
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Li, Dexin
- Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
-
- Trogdon, Kelly Griffith
- Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
-
- Sud, Rohan
- Hoek, Daniel
Subjects
dc:subject × 4Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- In Copyright
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Dc Identifier Other
- vt_gsexam:40219
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/119457