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Virginia Tech

Practical Feedback and Instrumentation Enhancements for Performant Security Testing of Closed-source Executables

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The Department of Homeland Security reports that over 90% of cyberattacks stem from security vulnerabilities in software, costing the U.S. $109 billion dollars in damages in 2016 alone according to The White House. As NIST estimates that today's software contains 25 bugs for every 1,000 lines of code, the prompt discovery of security flaws is now vital to mitigating the next major cyberattack. Over the last decade, the software industry has overwhelmingly turned to a lightweight defect discovery approach known as fuzzing: automated testing that uncovers program bugs through repeated injection of randomly-mutated test cases. Academic and industry efforts have long exploited the semantic richness of open-source software to enhance fuzzing with fast and fine-grained code coverage feedback, as well as fuzzing-enhancing code transformations facilitated through lightweight compiler-based instrumentation. However, the world's increasing reliance on closed-source software (i.e., commercial, proprietary, and legacy software) demands analogous advances in automated security vetting beyond open-source contexts. Unfortunately, the semantic gaps between source code and opaque binary code leave fuzzing nowhere near as effective on closed-source targets. The difficulty of balancing coverage feedback speed and precision in binary executables leaves fuzzers frequently bottlenecked and orders-of-magnitude slower at uncovering security vulnerabilities in closed-source software. Moreover, the challenges of analyzing and modifying binary executables at scale leaves closed-source software fuzzing unable to fully leverage the sophisticated enhancements that have long accelerated open-source software vulnerability discovery. As the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency reports that closed-source software makes up over 80% of the top routinely exploited software today, combating the ever-growing threat of cyberattacks demands new practical, precise, and performant fuzzing techniques unrestricted by the availability of source code. This thesis answers the following research questions toward enabling fast, effective fuzzing of closed-source software: 1. Can common-case fuzzing insights be exploited to more achieve low-overhead, fine-grained code coverage feedback irrespective of access to source code? 2. What properties of binary instrumentation are needed to extend performant fuzzing-enhancing program transformation to closed-source software fuzzing? In answering these questions, this thesis produces the following key innovations: A. The first code coverage techniques to enable fuzzing speed and code coverage greater than source-level fuzzing for closed-source software targets. (chapter 3) B. The first instrumentation platform to extend both compiler-quality code transformation and compiler-level speed to closed-source fuzzing contexts (chapter 4)

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science and Applications
Department dc:contributor.department
Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Virginia Tech
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Nagy, Stefan
Chair dc:contributor.committeechair
  • Hicks, Matthew
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Meng, Na
  • Yao, Danfeng
  • Kim, Taesoo
  • Wang, Gang

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
vt_gsexam:34370
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/110334

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Tech
Base URL
vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Nagy, Stefan. Practical Feedback and Instrumentation Enhancements for Performant Security Testing of Closed-source Executables. doctoral thesis, Virginia Tech, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/110334