{"id":{"repo_id":"vt","oai_identifier":"oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/103599"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vt/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/103599","repository":{"repo_id":"vt","name":"Virginia Tech","base_url":"https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essence, Revelation, and Physicalism","abstract":"Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties.","abstract_html":"Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Smith, Justyn Glynn"],"institution":"Virginia Tech","degree_name":"Master of Arts","degree_level":"masters","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"committee_members":["Hoek, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-06-03","date_published":"2021-06-03","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:29Z","subjects":["Revelation","physicalism","Broi","quality space","essence"],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:30217"],"render_values":[{"text":"vt_gsexam:30217","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103599","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeechair","label":"Committee Chair","values":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Hoek, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Smith, Justyn Glynn"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-06-04T08:00:45Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-06-04T08:00:45Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021-06-03"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Virginia Tech"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["masters"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Revelation","physicalism","Broi","quality space","essence"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["vt_gsexam:30217"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103599"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstractgeneral","label":"General Abstract","values":["When you taste a Golden Delicious apple, drink Ethiopian coffee, feel dental pain, hear classical music or have many other conscious experiences of things, there's *something it's like* to be in those states. The taste of the apple and the coffee and the feel of dental pain are phenomenal properties - the \"feels\" of things in the broadest possible sense. Philosophers wonder what these things - \"feels\" - really are. Are they neurological features of your brain or a material features generally or are they something different? In a recent essay, Antonin Broi attacks the idea that they are something other than material or brain states. If Revelation - the idea that experiences reveal the essences of phenomenal properties - and some ideas about the general nature of phenomenal properties are both true, then strange results arise. I argue against his reasoning and I give a better way to understand Revelation."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts"]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["ETD"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essence, Revelation, and Physicalism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeechair":["Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Hoek, Daniel","Patton, Lydia K."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Smith, Justyn Glynn"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-06-04T08:00:45Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-06-04T08:00:45Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2021-06-03"],"dc:description.abstract":["Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties."],"dc:description.abstractgeneral":["When you taste a Golden Delicious apple, drink Ethiopian coffee, feel dental pain, hear classical music or have many other conscious experiences of things, there's *something it's like* to be in those states. The taste of the apple and the coffee and the feel of dental pain are phenomenal properties - the \"feels\" of things in the broadest possible sense. Philosophers wonder what these things - \"feels\" - really are. Are they neurological features of your brain or a material features generally or are they something different? In a recent essay, Antonin Broi attacks the idea that they are something other than material or brain states. If Revelation - the idea that experiences reveal the essences of phenomenal properties - and some ideas about the general nature of phenomenal properties are both true, then strange results arise. I argue against his reasoning and I give a better way to understand Revelation."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts"],"dc:format.medium":["ETD"],"dc:identifier.other":["vt_gsexam:30217"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103599"],"dc:publisher":["Virginia Tech"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Revelation","physicalism","Broi","quality space","essence"],"dc:title":["Essence, Revelation, and Physicalism"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts"],"thesis:institution_name":["Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:29Z"}