{"id":{"repo_id":"vilnius","oai_identifier":"oai:vu.lt:elaba:210585553"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/vilnius/oai:vu.lt:elaba:210585553","repository":{"repo_id":"vilnius","name":"Vilnius University","base_url":"https://epublications.vu.lt/oai"},"display":{"title":"Pierre'o Manent'o iššūkis Ronaldo Dworkino žmogaus teisių sampratai /","abstract":"This paper explores the compatibility between the prevailing liberal philosophy of natural human rights and the contemporary science of law and politics, characterized by a positivist or rationalist mindset. The analysis aims to elucidate why the joint critique of modern positivist thought and its moral relativism, as articulated in the works of American legal theorist Ronald Dworkin and French political philosopher Pierre Manent, has prompted these philosophers to engage in a polemic regarding natural human rights. The paper contends that Dworkin’s endeavour to demonstrate the objectivity of natural human rights by formulating a new liberal theory of jurisprudence remains unfulfilled due to a gap in the philosopher’s position identified through analysis. This gap, specifically the reluctance to ontologically consider the concepts under examination, gives rise to significant tensions between instrumentalist and rationalist interpretations of various aspects of the theory. In contrast, Manent’s approach is characterized by a thorough and consistent phenomenological investigation of the concepts under scrutiny. This method allows philosopher to explore ontological issues without any constraints and facilitates the discovery of the fundamental alignment between the ideas of positivism and liberalism, a connection elusive in Dworkin’s position. By reconstructing and comparing the authors’ stances on the issue of natural human rights, it becomes evident that Manent’s arguments exhibit superior consistency in approach compared to the claims of Dworkin’s liberal theory, which are marred by internal contradictions and positivistic assumptions.","abstract_html":"This paper explores the compatibility between the prevailing liberal philosophy of natural human rights and the contemporary science of law and politics, characterized by a positivist or rationalist mindset. The analysis aims to elucidate why the joint critique of modern positivist thought and its moral relativism, as articulated in the works of American legal theorist Ronald Dworkin and French political philosopher Pierre Manent, has prompted these philosophers to engage in a polemic regarding natural human rights. The paper contends that Dworkin’s endeavour to demonstrate the objectivity of natural human rights by formulating a new liberal theory of jurisprudence remains unfulfilled due to a gap in the philosopher’s position identified through analysis. This gap, specifically the reluctance to ontologically consider the concepts under examination, gives rise to significant tensions between instrumentalist and rationalist interpretations of various aspects of the theory. In contrast, Manent’s approach is characterized by a thorough and consistent phenomenological investigation of the concepts under scrutiny. This method allows philosopher to explore ontological issues without any constraints and facilitates the discovery of the fundamental alignment between the ideas of positivism and liberalism, a connection elusive in Dworkin’s position. By reconstructing and comparing the authors’ stances on the issue of natural human rights, it becomes evident that Manent’s arguments exhibit superior consistency in approach compared to the claims of Dworkin’s liberal theory, which are marred by internal contradictions and positivistic assumptions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Žutautas, Matas,"],"institution":"Institutional Repository of Vilnius University","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024","date_published":"2024","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:55:52Z","subjects":[],"languages":["lit"],"rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD210585553&prefLang=en_US","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Žutautas, Matas,"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Institutional Repository of Vilnius University"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["https://epublications.vu.lt/object/elaba:210585553/210585553.pdf"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["lit"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD210585553&prefLang=en_US"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This paper explores the compatibility between the prevailing liberal philosophy of natural human rights and the contemporary science of law and politics, characterized by a positivist or rationalist mindset. The analysis aims to elucidate why the joint critique of modern positivist thought and its moral relativism, as articulated in the works of American legal theorist Ronald Dworkin and French political philosopher Pierre Manent, has prompted these philosophers to engage in a polemic regarding natural human rights. The paper contends that Dworkin’s endeavour to demonstrate the objectivity of natural human rights by formulating a new liberal theory of jurisprudence remains unfulfilled due to a gap in the philosopher’s position identified through analysis. This gap, specifically the reluctance to ontologically consider the concepts under examination, gives rise to significant tensions between instrumentalist and rationalist interpretations of various aspects of the theory. In contrast, Manent’s approach is characterized by a thorough and consistent phenomenological investigation of the concepts under scrutiny. This method allows philosopher to explore ontological issues without any constraints and facilitates the discovery of the fundamental alignment between the ideas of positivism and liberalism, a connection elusive in Dworkin’s position. By reconstructing and comparing the authors’ stances on the issue of natural human rights, it becomes evident that Manent’s arguments exhibit superior consistency in approach compared to the claims of Dworkin’s liberal theory, which are marred by internal contradictions and positivistic assumptions."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Pierre'o Manent'o iššūkis Ronaldo Dworkino žmogaus teisių sampratai /","Pierre manent's challenge to ronald dworkin's concept of human rights."]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Žutautas, Matas,"],"dc:date":["2024"],"dc:description":["This paper explores the compatibility between the prevailing liberal philosophy of natural human rights and the contemporary science of law and politics, characterized by a positivist or rationalist mindset. The analysis aims to elucidate why the joint critique of modern positivist thought and its moral relativism, as articulated in the works of American legal theorist Ronald Dworkin and French political philosopher Pierre Manent, has prompted these philosophers to engage in a polemic regarding natural human rights. The paper contends that Dworkin’s endeavour to demonstrate the objectivity of natural human rights by formulating a new liberal theory of jurisprudence remains unfulfilled due to a gap in the philosopher’s position identified through analysis. This gap, specifically the reluctance to ontologically consider the concepts under examination, gives rise to significant tensions between instrumentalist and rationalist interpretations of various aspects of the theory. In contrast, Manent’s approach is characterized by a thorough and consistent phenomenological investigation of the concepts under scrutiny. This method allows philosopher to explore ontological issues without any constraints and facilitates the discovery of the fundamental alignment between the ideas of positivism and liberalism, a connection elusive in Dworkin’s position. By reconstructing and comparing the authors’ stances on the issue of natural human rights, it becomes evident that Manent’s arguments exhibit superior consistency in approach compared to the claims of Dworkin’s liberal theory, which are marred by internal contradictions and positivistic assumptions."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD210585553&prefLang=en_US"],"dc:language":["lit"],"dc:publisher":["Institutional Repository of Vilnius University"],"dc:relation":["https://epublications.vu.lt/object/elaba:210585553/210585553.pdf"],"dc:rights":["info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"],"dc:title":["Pierre'o Manent'o iššūkis Ronaldo Dworkino žmogaus teisių sampratai /","Pierre manent's challenge to ronald dworkin's concept of human rights."],"dc:type":["info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:55:52Z"}