How Ought We to Justify our Moral Judgements?
type: CreativeWork
description: What counts as a good defence of a moral judgement? In answer to this question, I begin with an account of the structure of the simplest moral judgements. I point out that for moral responsibility – praise or blame to be appropriately ascribed to the person making it, such a judgement must be self-determined. However, we do not start from scratch in this. We can interrogate our received social values and also the obligations entailed by the social roles we fill. I then argue that for an adequate justification, our autonomous moral judgements must satisfy two formal conditions, universalisability and impartiality. More importantly, even if they are universalised and impartial, our judgement-making can be unsuccessful due to our lack of certain practical skills. These include the ability to properly identify the problem; the need to be sufficiently informed about the relevant non-moral facts in the case; the ability to identify the actual interests of those affected by our judgement; or to fully think through the alternatives open to us and be aware of the consequences of a preferred solution. Also our justification can be ineffective because of our failure to emotionally engage with the course of action prescribed, or to be insufficiently motivated to carry it out. It can fail argumentatively due to our inability to sympathetically explain our decision to others and, most importantly, due to our lack of experience in making decisions of this nature. Added to this, we must recognise that dissent is always possible and that we need to seriously consider and answer any objections. If these conditions are met, I maintain that this constitutes a good defence of a moral judgement. Moreover, I suggest that it is not then always an open question as to what our autonomous (universalised and impartial) moral judgements ought to be.
abstract: What counts as a good defence of a moral judgement? In answer to this question, I begin with an account of the structure of the simplest moral judgements. I point out that for moral responsibility – praise or blame to be appropriately ascribed to the person making it, such a judgement must be self-determined. However, we do not start from scratch in this. We can interrogate our received social values and also the obligations entailed by the social roles we fill. I then argue that for an adequate justification, our autonomous moral judgements must satisfy two formal conditions, universalisability and impartiality. More importantly, even if they are universalised and impartial, our judgement-making can be unsuccessful due to our lack of certain practical skills. These include the ability to properly identify the problem; the need to be sufficiently informed about the relevant non-moral facts in the case; the ability to identify the actual interests of those affected by our judgement; or to fully think through the alternatives open to us and be aware of the consequences of a preferred solution. Also our justification can be ineffective because of our failure to emotionally engage with the course of action prescribed, or to be insufficiently motivated to carry it out. It can fail argumentatively due to our inability to sympathetically explain our decision to others and, most importantly, due to our lack of experience in making decisions of this nature. Added to this, we must recognise that dissent is always possible and that we need to seriously consider and answer any objections. If these conditions are met, I maintain that this constitutes a good defence of a moral judgement. Moreover, I suggest that it is not then always an open question as to what our autonomous (universalised and impartial) moral judgements ought to be.
author: Dowling, Keith
keywords: B Athroniaeth (Cyffredinol)
date published: 2024-06
date modified: 2026-07-24T05:53:02Z
provider: University of Wales Trinity Saint David
publisher: Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations
type: WebPage
source organization: University of Wales Trinity Saint David

PropertyValue
property ID: DOI
value: 10.82227/repository.uwtsd.ac.uk.00003092