{"id":{"repo_id":"uwo","oai_identifier":"oai:uwo.scholaris.ca:20.500.14721/35319"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uwo/oai:uwo.scholaris.ca:20.500.14721/35319","repository":{"repo_id":"uwo","name":"Western University","base_url":"https://uwo.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Optimal Contract Design for Co-development of Companion Diagnostics","abstract":"As the number of new drugs requiring companion diagnostics rises, more and more partnerships are formed between drug and diagnostics manufacturers to develop the necessary companion diagnostic. An increasingly significant issue is that of the optimal revenue/profit sharing or compensation schemes for such partnerships. We investigate the structure of an optimal compensation scheme under a scenario where a large pharmaceutical firm that is developing a drug intends to partner with a smaller diagnostics firm to develop a companion diagnostic test for the drug. We describe an optimal contract as one that maximizes the pharmaceutical firm's expected profits while offering enough incentives for the diagnostics firm to accept the contract and then work at an effort level that is preferred by the pharmaceutical firm. We formulate the problem of determining the optimal contract as an instance of the Principal-Agent problem. We then present a numerical approach for solving the problem.","abstract_html":"As the number of new drugs requiring companion diagnostics rises, more and more partnerships are formed between drug and diagnostics manufacturers to develop the necessary companion diagnostic. An increasingly significant issue is that of the optimal revenue/profit sharing or compensation schemes for such partnerships. We investigate the structure of an optimal compensation scheme under a scenario where a large pharmaceutical firm that is developing a drug intends to partner with a smaller diagnostics firm to develop a companion diagnostic test for the drug. We describe an optimal contract as one that maximizes the pharmaceutical firm's expected profits while offering enough incentives for the diagnostics firm to accept the contract and then work at an effort level that is preferred by the pharmaceutical firm. We formulate the problem of determining the optimal contract as an instance of the Principal-Agent problem. We then present a numerical approach for solving the problem.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tembo, Rodney T"],"institution":"The University of Western Ontario","degree_name":"M Sc","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Applied Mathematics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Matt Davison","Greg Zaric"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-09-02","date_published":"2014-09-02","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:56:14Z","subjects":["Companion Diagnostics","Optimization","Principal-Agent Problem","Moral Hazard"],"languages":["en_ca"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14721/35319","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Matt Davison","Greg Zaric"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Tembo, Rodney T"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2025-07-10T20:36:47Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2025-07-10T20:36:47Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2014-09-02"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["The University of Western Ontario"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Applied Mathematics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M Sc"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Companion Diagnostics","Optimization","Principal-Agent Problem","Moral Hazard"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_ca"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14721/35319"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The thesis cover page in the PDF document includes references to Western University’s previous institutional repository platform, known as Scholarship@Western, and links to that platform (beginning with ir.lib.uwo.ca). In citing or referring to this thesis, use the DOI or handle from this page instead. Sample citation: Author name, \"Thesis title.\" (Year). Western University Open Repository. https://doi.org/10.71858/123456."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["As the number of new drugs requiring companion diagnostics rises, more and more partnerships are formed between drug and diagnostics manufacturers to develop the necessary companion diagnostic. An increasingly significant issue is that of the optimal revenue/profit sharing or compensation schemes for such partnerships. We investigate the structure of an optimal compensation scheme under a scenario where a large pharmaceutical firm that is developing a drug intends to partner with a smaller diagnostics firm to develop a companion diagnostic test for the drug. We describe an optimal contract as one that maximizes the pharmaceutical firm's expected profits while offering enough incentives for the diagnostics firm to accept the contract and then work at an effort level that is preferred by the pharmaceutical firm. We formulate the problem of determining the optimal contract as an instance of the Principal-Agent problem. We then present a numerical approach for solving the problem."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Optimal Contract Design for Co-development of Companion Diagnostics"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Matt Davison","Greg Zaric"],"dc:creator":["Tembo, Rodney T"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-07-10T20:36:47Z"],"dc:date.available":["2025-07-10T20:36:47Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2014-09-02"],"dc:description":["The thesis cover page in the PDF document includes references to Western University’s previous institutional repository platform, known as Scholarship@Western, and links to that platform (beginning with ir.lib.uwo.ca). In citing or referring to this thesis, use the DOI or handle from this page instead. Sample citation: Author name, \"Thesis title.\" (Year). Western University Open Repository. https://doi.org/10.71858/123456."],"dc:description.abstract":["As the number of new drugs requiring companion diagnostics rises, more and more partnerships are formed between drug and diagnostics manufacturers to develop the necessary companion diagnostic. An increasingly significant issue is that of the optimal revenue/profit sharing or compensation schemes for such partnerships. We investigate the structure of an optimal compensation scheme under a scenario where a large pharmaceutical firm that is developing a drug intends to partner with a smaller diagnostics firm to develop a companion diagnostic test for the drug. We describe an optimal contract as one that maximizes the pharmaceutical firm's expected profits while offering enough incentives for the diagnostics firm to accept the contract and then work at an effort level that is preferred by the pharmaceutical firm. We formulate the problem of determining the optimal contract as an instance of the Principal-Agent problem. We then present a numerical approach for solving the problem."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14721/35319"],"dc:language.iso":["en_ca"],"dc:publisher":["The University of Western Ontario"],"dc:subject":["Companion Diagnostics","Optimization","Principal-Agent Problem","Moral Hazard"],"dc:title":["Optimal Contract Design for Co-development of Companion Diagnostics"],"dc:type":["thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Applied Mathematics"],"thesis:degree_name":["M Sc"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:56:14Z"}