{"id":{"repo_id":"utc","oai_identifier":"oai:scholar.utc.edu:theses-1410"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/utc/oai:scholar.utc.edu:theses-1410","repository":{"repo_id":"utc","name":"University of Tennessee - Chattanooga","base_url":"https://scholar.utc.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Network covert channels on the Android platform","abstract":"Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment in a way that is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. These secret channels have been identified as an important security threat to governments and the private sector, and several research efforts have focused on the design, detection, and prevention of such channels in enterprise-type environments. Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing platform, and are storing or have access to an increasingly large amount of sensitive information. As such, these devices have become prime targets of attackers who desire access to this information. In this work, we explore the implementation of network covert channels on the Google Android mobile platform. Our work shows that covert communication channels can be successfully implemented on the Android platform to allow data to be leaked from these devices in a manner that hides the fact that subversive communication is taking place.","abstract_html":"Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment in a way that is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. These secret channels have been identified as an important security threat to governments and the private sector, and several research efforts have focused on the design, detection, and prevention of such channels in enterprise-type environments. Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing platform, and are storing or have access to an increasingly large amount of sensitive information. As such, these devices have become prime targets of attackers who desire access to this information. In this work, we explore the implementation of network covert channels on the Google Android mobile platform. Our work shows that covert communication channels can be successfully implemented on the Android platform to allow data to be leaked from these devices in a manner that hides the fact that subversive communication is taking place.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gasior, Wade Chester"],"institution":"University of Tennessee at Chattanooga","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Yang, Li","Sartipi, Mina; Kizza, Joseph","College of Engineering and Computer Science"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:46:19Z","subjects":["Computer security"],"languages":["English","eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholar.utc.edu/theses/270","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Yang, Li","Sartipi, Mina; Kizza, Joseph","College of Engineering and Computer Science"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gasior, Wade Chester"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-12-01T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["University of Tennessee at Chattanooga","Chattanooga (Tenn.)"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Masters Theses and Doctoral Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Masters theses","Text"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Computer security"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English","eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholar.utc.edu/theses/270"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering","M. S.; A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Science."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment in a way that is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. These secret channels have been identified as an important security threat to governments and the private sector, and several research efforts have focused on the design, detection, and prevention of such channels in enterprise-type environments. Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing platform, and are storing or have access to an increasingly large amount of sensitive information. As such, these devices have become prime targets of attackers who desire access to this information. In this work, we explore the implementation of network covert channels on the Google Android mobile platform. Our work shows that covert communication channels can be successfully implemented on the Android platform to allow data to be leaked from these devices in a manner that hides the fact that subversive communication is taking place."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Network covert channels on the Android platform"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Yang, Li","Sartipi, Mina; Kizza, Joseph","College of Engineering and Computer Science"],"dc:creator":["Gasior, Wade Chester"],"dc:date":["2011-12-01T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering","M. S.; A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Science."],"dc:description.abstract":["Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment in a way that is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. These secret channels have been identified as an important security threat to governments and the private sector, and several research efforts have focused on the design, detection, and prevention of such channels in enterprise-type environments. Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing platform, and are storing or have access to an increasingly large amount of sensitive information. As such, these devices have become prime targets of attackers who desire access to this information. In this work, we explore the implementation of network covert channels on the Google Android mobile platform. Our work shows that covert communication channels can be successfully implemented on the Android platform to allow data to be leaked from these devices in a manner that hides the fact that subversive communication is taking place."],"dc:identifier":["https://scholar.utc.edu/theses/270"],"dc:language":["English","eng"],"dc:publisher":["University of Tennessee at Chattanooga","Chattanooga (Tenn.)"],"dc:relation":["Masters Theses and Doctoral Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en"],"dc:subject":["Computer security"],"dc:title":["Network covert channels on the Android platform"],"dc:type":["Masters theses","Text"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:46:19Z"}