This project examines when and why governments escalate repression during political crises, focusing specifically on how a leader's perceived \"domain of losses\" drives coercive behavior. Bridging research on state repression, electoral authoritarianism, and prospect theory, the thesis argues that crisis-induced coercion is highly uneven. Escalation typically occurs only when acute political threats align with vulnerable incumbents and institutional setups that allow for tighter control without fully dismantling electoral competition.
To test this, the research uses an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach. The quantitative section analyzes a panel of 179 countries from 2009 to 2024. Using two-way fixed-effects models, the study measures whether new crises trigger spikes in physical repression or information control, paying close attention to how electoral autocracies in a loss-domain react. To map out the actual causal mechanisms at play, the project then traces the political trajectory of Bangladesh over the same 15-year period.
The data shows almost no evidence of a universal \"crisis effect\" across states. Instead, the response is highly conditional. When electoral autocracies operate under a domain of losses, a new crisis strongly predicts a crackdown on information. While broad physical repression is less consistent in the global data, it still surges in specific scenarios—most notably during coup attempts and through sudden, targeted spikes by electoral autocrats. The Bangladesh case grounds these numbers, illustrating how a regime can weaponize a crisis using a calculated mix of selective force, legal manipulation, and media censorship. Overall, the research suggests that modern diversionary repression is moving away from blunt physical violence; today's autocratic toolkits are increasingly institutionalized, conditional, and heavily focused on controlling the flow of information.
","abstract_html":"<p>This project examines when and why governments escalate repression during political crises, focusing specifically on how a leader's perceived "domain of losses" drives coercive behavior. Bridging research on state repression, electoral authoritarianism, and prospect theory, the thesis argues that crisis-induced coercion is highly uneven. Escalation typically occurs only when acute political threats align with vulnerable incumbents and institutional setups that allow for tighter control without fully dismantling electoral competition.</p> <p>To test this, the research uses an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach. The quantitative section analyzes a panel of 179 countries from 2009 to 2024. Using two-way fixed-effects models, the study measures whether new crises trigger spikes in physical repression or information control, paying close attention to how electoral autocracies in a loss-domain react. To map out the actual causal mechanisms at play, the project then traces the political trajectory of Bangladesh over the same 15-year period.</p> <p>The data shows almost no evidence of a universal "crisis effect" across states. Instead, the response is highly conditional. When electoral autocracies operate under a domain of losses, a new crisis strongly predicts a crackdown on information. While broad physical repression is less consistent in the global data, it still surges in specific scenarios—most notably during coup attempts and through sudden, targeted spikes by electoral autocrats. The Bangladesh case grounds these numbers, illustrating how a regime can weaponize a crisis using a calculated mix of selective force, legal manipulation, and media censorship. Overall, the research suggests that modern diversionary repression is moving away from blunt physical violence; today's autocratic toolkits are increasingly institutionalized, conditional, and heavily focused on controlling the flow of information.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Obaidullah, Md"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":"Masters Thesis","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Dr. Joe Weinberg","Dr. Marek Steedman","Dr. Maggie Martin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026-05-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2026-05-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:45:55Z","subjects":["Diversionary repression","electoral autocracy","crisis onset","information control","Bangladesh","Comparative Politics","International Relations","Models and Methods","Peace and Conflict Studies","Social Policy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/1187","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Dr. Joe Weinberg","Dr. Marek Steedman","Dr. Maggie Martin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Obaidullah, Md"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2027-05-31T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Diversionary repression","electoral autocracy","crisis onset","information control","Bangladesh","Comparative Politics","International Relations","Models and Methods","Peace and Conflict Studies","Social Policy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/1187"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This project examines when and why governments escalate repression during political crises, focusing specifically on how a leader's perceived \"domain of losses\" drives coercive behavior. Bridging research on state repression, electoral authoritarianism, and prospect theory, the thesis argues that crisis-induced coercion is highly uneven. Escalation typically occurs only when acute political threats align with vulnerable incumbents and institutional setups that allow for tighter control without fully dismantling electoral competition.
To test this, the research uses an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach. The quantitative section analyzes a panel of 179 countries from 2009 to 2024. Using two-way fixed-effects models, the study measures whether new crises trigger spikes in physical repression or information control, paying close attention to how electoral autocracies in a loss-domain react. To map out the actual causal mechanisms at play, the project then traces the political trajectory of Bangladesh over the same 15-year period.
The data shows almost no evidence of a universal \"crisis effect\" across states. Instead, the response is highly conditional. When electoral autocracies operate under a domain of losses, a new crisis strongly predicts a crackdown on information. While broad physical repression is less consistent in the global data, it still surges in specific scenarios—most notably during coup attempts and through sudden, targeted spikes by electoral autocrats. The Bangladesh case grounds these numbers, illustrating how a regime can weaponize a crisis using a calculated mix of selective force, legal manipulation, and media censorship. Overall, the research suggests that modern diversionary repression is moving away from blunt physical violence; today's autocratic toolkits are increasingly institutionalized, conditional, and heavily focused on controlling the flow of information.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Diversionary Repression in Electoral Autocracies: Crisis Onset, Loss-Domain Conditions, and State Escalation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Dr. Joe Weinberg","Dr. Marek Steedman","Dr. Maggie Martin"],"dc:creator":["Obaidullah, Md"],"dc:date.available":["2027-05-31T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This project examines when and why governments escalate repression during political crises, focusing specifically on how a leader's perceived \"domain of losses\" drives coercive behavior. Bridging research on state repression, electoral authoritarianism, and prospect theory, the thesis argues that crisis-induced coercion is highly uneven. Escalation typically occurs only when acute political threats align with vulnerable incumbents and institutional setups that allow for tighter control without fully dismantling electoral competition.
To test this, the research uses an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach. The quantitative section analyzes a panel of 179 countries from 2009 to 2024. Using two-way fixed-effects models, the study measures whether new crises trigger spikes in physical repression or information control, paying close attention to how electoral autocracies in a loss-domain react. To map out the actual causal mechanisms at play, the project then traces the political trajectory of Bangladesh over the same 15-year period.
The data shows almost no evidence of a universal \"crisis effect\" across states. Instead, the response is highly conditional. When electoral autocracies operate under a domain of losses, a new crisis strongly predicts a crackdown on information. While broad physical repression is less consistent in the global data, it still surges in specific scenarios—most notably during coup attempts and through sudden, targeted spikes by electoral autocrats. The Bangladesh case grounds these numbers, illustrating how a regime can weaponize a crisis using a calculated mix of selective force, legal manipulation, and media censorship. Overall, the research suggests that modern diversionary repression is moving away from blunt physical violence; today's autocratic toolkits are increasingly institutionalized, conditional, and heavily focused on controlling the flow of information.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/1187"],"dc:subject":["Diversionary repression","electoral autocracy","crisis onset","information control","Bangladesh","Comparative Politics","International Relations","Models and Methods","Peace and Conflict Studies","Social Policy"],"dc:title":["Diversionary Repression in Electoral Autocracies: Crisis Onset, Loss-Domain Conditions, and State Escalation"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:45:55Z"}