Individuals consistently tend to underestimate the likelihood of negative events happening to them and fail to update these beliefs adequately when provided with statistical evidence. However, depressed populations are better able to accurately update beliefs. It is not clear if the ability to update beliefs effectively is due to overall dysphoria or are partially due to momentary fluctuations of acute affective states. Undergraduates (N=83) completed a belief updating task where they estimated the likelihood of a negative event happening to them, were presented with the actual likelihood of the event, and then re-estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them. Prior to completing the belief updating task participants were randomized to undergo a neutral or a negative (i.e., sadness) mood induction. After completing the task participants completed the other mood induction and the belief updating task a second time with a second list of events. Whether information was desirable or undesirable (i.e., whether the initial estimate was higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on belief updates (F(1, 72) = 22.126, p < .001, η_G^2 = .042). No significant effect was found between acute hopelessness and belief updates. Linear mixed modelling revealed a significant interaction effect of information type and induction on belief updates (β = -4.15, SE = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Analyses that accounted for intra-individual and trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted with the type of information received to reduce optimism bias.
","abstract_html":"<p>Individuals consistently tend to underestimate the likelihood of negative events happening to them and fail to update these beliefs adequately when provided with statistical evidence. However, depressed populations are better able to accurately update beliefs. It is not clear if the ability to update beliefs effectively is due to overall dysphoria or are partially due to momentary fluctuations of acute affective states. Undergraduates (N=83) completed a belief updating task where they estimated the likelihood of a negative event happening to them, were presented with the actual likelihood of the event, and then re-estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them. Prior to completing the belief updating task participants were randomized to undergo a neutral or a negative (i.e., sadness) mood induction. After completing the task participants completed the other mood induction and the belief updating task a second time with a second list of events. Whether information was desirable or undesirable (i.e., whether the initial estimate was higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on belief updates (F(1, 72) = 22.126, p < .001, η_G^2 = .042). No significant effect was found between acute hopelessness and belief updates. Linear mixed modelling revealed a significant interaction effect of information type and induction on belief updates (β = -4.15, SE = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Analyses that accounted for intra-individual and trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted with the type of information received to reduce optimism bias.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Karnick, Aleksandr"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Arts (MA)","degree_level":"Masters Thesis","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Dr. Daniel Capron","Dr. Kelsey Bonfils","Dr. Donald Sacco"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-04-01T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2022-04-01T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:45:33Z","subjects":["affect","belief updating","cognitive bias","Clinical Psychology"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/871","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Dr. Daniel Capron","Dr. Kelsey Bonfils","Dr. Donald Sacco"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Karnick, Aleksandr"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2022-02-16T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["affect","belief updating","cognitive bias","Clinical Psychology"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/871"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Individuals consistently tend to underestimate the likelihood of negative events happening to them and fail to update these beliefs adequately when provided with statistical evidence. However, depressed populations are better able to accurately update beliefs. It is not clear if the ability to update beliefs effectively is due to overall dysphoria or are partially due to momentary fluctuations of acute affective states. Undergraduates (N=83) completed a belief updating task where they estimated the likelihood of a negative event happening to them, were presented with the actual likelihood of the event, and then re-estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them. Prior to completing the belief updating task participants were randomized to undergo a neutral or a negative (i.e., sadness) mood induction. After completing the task participants completed the other mood induction and the belief updating task a second time with a second list of events. Whether information was desirable or undesirable (i.e., whether the initial estimate was higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on belief updates (F(1, 72) = 22.126, p < .001, η_G^2 = .042). No significant effect was found between acute hopelessness and belief updates. Linear mixed modelling revealed a significant interaction effect of information type and induction on belief updates (β = -4.15, SE = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Analyses that accounted for intra-individual and trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted with the type of information received to reduce optimism bias.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Assessing the effect of negative mood states on valence-dependent belief updating"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Dr. Daniel Capron","Dr. Kelsey Bonfils","Dr. Donald Sacco"],"dc:creator":["Karnick, Aleksandr"],"dc:date.available":["2022-02-16T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Individuals consistently tend to underestimate the likelihood of negative events happening to them and fail to update these beliefs adequately when provided with statistical evidence. However, depressed populations are better able to accurately update beliefs. It is not clear if the ability to update beliefs effectively is due to overall dysphoria or are partially due to momentary fluctuations of acute affective states. Undergraduates (N=83) completed a belief updating task where they estimated the likelihood of a negative event happening to them, were presented with the actual likelihood of the event, and then re-estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them. Prior to completing the belief updating task participants were randomized to undergo a neutral or a negative (i.e., sadness) mood induction. After completing the task participants completed the other mood induction and the belief updating task a second time with a second list of events. Whether information was desirable or undesirable (i.e., whether the initial estimate was higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on belief updates (F(1, 72) = 22.126, p < .001, η_G^2 = .042). No significant effect was found between acute hopelessness and belief updates. Linear mixed modelling revealed a significant interaction effect of information type and induction on belief updates (β = -4.15, SE = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Analyses that accounted for intra-individual and trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted with the type of information received to reduce optimism bias.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/871"],"dc:subject":["affect","belief updating","cognitive bias","Clinical Psychology"],"dc:title":["Assessing the effect of negative mood states on valence-dependent belief updating"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:45:33Z"}