This paper examines the intrusion of political system on performance of Indian firms, employing state and constituency level financial borrowing panel data by firms from domestic banks from 2010 to 2015. Using conditional logistic and fixed effects regression models, the results suggests that firms located in regions aligned politically with the ruling party enjoy possible preferential access to financing from banks. We find average productivity efficiency loss of 2.77% in the short term as a result of politically motivated redistribution of scarce capital. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of region fixed effects, time fixed effects and other socio-economic factors.
","abstract_html":"<p>This paper examines the intrusion of political system on performance of Indian firms, employing state and constituency level financial borrowing panel data by firms from domestic banks from 2010 to 2015. Using conditional logistic and fixed effects regression models, the results suggests that firms located in regions aligned politically with the ruling party enjoy possible preferential access to financing from banks. We find average productivity efficiency loss of 2.77% in the short term as a result of politically motivated redistribution of scarce capital. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of region fixed effects, time fixed effects and other socio-economic factors.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gunjal, Shivprasad Prabhakar"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science in International and Development Economics (MSIDEC)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Suparna Chakraborty","Michael Jonas"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-05-19T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2017-05-19T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:44:00Z","subjects":["Political Economy","Politically Motivated Redistribution","Political Alliance"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/239","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Suparna Chakraborty","Michael Jonas"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gunjal, Shivprasad Prabhakar"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2017-05-31T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science in International and Development Economics (MSIDEC)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political Economy","Politically Motivated Redistribution","Political Alliance"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/239"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This paper examines the intrusion of political system on performance of Indian firms, employing state and constituency level financial borrowing panel data by firms from domestic banks from 2010 to 2015. Using conditional logistic and fixed effects regression models, the results suggests that firms located in regions aligned politically with the ruling party enjoy possible preferential access to financing from banks. We find average productivity efficiency loss of 2.77% in the short term as a result of politically motivated redistribution of scarce capital. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of region fixed effects, time fixed effects and other socio-economic factors.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Political Intrusion on Firms: Effects of Elections on Bank Lending in India"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Suparna Chakraborty","Michael Jonas"],"dc:creator":["Gunjal, Shivprasad Prabhakar"],"dc:date.available":["2017-05-31T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This paper examines the intrusion of political system on performance of Indian firms, employing state and constituency level financial borrowing panel data by firms from domestic banks from 2010 to 2015. Using conditional logistic and fixed effects regression models, the results suggests that firms located in regions aligned politically with the ruling party enjoy possible preferential access to financing from banks. We find average productivity efficiency loss of 2.77% in the short term as a result of politically motivated redistribution of scarce capital. These political effects are statistically robust to the inclusion of region fixed effects, time fixed effects and other socio-economic factors.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/239"],"dc:subject":["Political Economy","Politically Motivated Redistribution","Political Alliance"],"dc:title":["Political Intrusion on Firms: Effects of Elections on Bank Lending in India"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science in International and Development Economics (MSIDEC)"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:44:00Z"}