Can Neoclassical Trade Theory Explain Congressional Voting?

<p>The neoclassical trade model has notoriously been unable to empirically predict trade flows throughout the world, however there has been a notion that the same theories and predictions could also be applied to democratic voting on free trade legislation. Using roll-call votes on three 2011 United States bilateral trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, respectively, a simple empirical model based on the neoclassical concepts, specifically the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson corollary theorems, is outlined. After an analysis using a logit estimation method, it is revealed that there is conflicting evidence whether the voting on the 2011 free trade agreements follow the initial predictions given by the model, indicating that the representatives did not explicitly take into account district skill level while voting. However, the results do support that there is certainly a driving factor within the industrial composition of the district, as well as key political and economic components that help explain the voting behavior of Congress.</p>

Name thesis:degree_name

Master of Arts in International and Development Economics

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Year dc:date.available

2013

Author dc:creator

• Dellipriscoli, John

Contributors dc:contributor

• Bruce Wydick
• Hartmut Fischer
• Suparna Chakraborty

• International trade
• Heckscher Ohlin
• Stolper Samuelson
• Political Economy
• Econometrics
• International Economics
• Macroeconomics

Repository record dc:identifier

https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/69

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:repository.usfca.edu:thes-1076