The Political Economy of Organizational Expansion. Finding the Link Between Insider and Outsider in the European Union

Scholars often address the process of enlargement as one-sided argument. This work provides a general theory of organizational expansion by including strategies and actions of both, applicant states and members of international organizations. It is argued that dependent on the domestic characteristics of states an organization strategically implement a set of conditions to avoid the application and admission of states, which are either not able to conform with the rules or not willing to pay the costs of membership. This process incorporates two stages. I test this theory by utilizing a Heckman-Probit-Selection Model, which accounts for this two-stage procedure. The results confirm that conditions are important to avoid costs in the process of expansion.

Grantor dc:publisher

University of North Texas

Year dc:date

2003

Author dc:creator

• Schneider, Christina J.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Tan, Alexander
• Kang, Seonjou
• Smith, Donald Wiley

• European Union.
• Europe -- Economic integration.
• organizational enlargement
• European Union
• signal game
• Heckman selection model
• political economy

Statement dc:rights

• Public
• Copyright
• Schneider, Christina J.
• Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights reserved.

Language dc:language

English

Identifier

oclc: 53126240
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4181/
ark: ark:/67531/metadc4181

OAI identifier oai:identifier

info:ark/67531/metadc4181