{"id":{"repo_id":"unt","oai_identifier":"info:ark/67531/metadc3204"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/unt/info:ark/67531/metadc3204","repository":{"repo_id":"unt","name":"University of North Texas","base_url":"https://digital.library.unt.edu/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Civil Asset Forfeiture in the Fight Against Drugs (Policy Analysis)","abstract":"Even if the main criminals of an organization are incarcerated, they will be replaced by others who would continue illegal activities, unless their financial assets are removed. Thus, civil forfeiture intends to dismantle the economic infrastructure of drug trafficking networks. Civil forfeiture considers the property as guilty, rather than the owner, and it may exist even if there is not a criminal action. Therefore, it is claimed that police agencies have chosen easy targets, such as wealthy drug users rather than major drug traffickers. Consequently, it has been particularly challenged on the basis of the Excessive Fines, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses. The use of criminal forfeiture instead of civil forfeiture and the elimination of the equitable sharing provision are considered to be the primary solutions.","abstract_html":"Even if the main criminals of an organization are incarcerated, they will be replaced by others who would continue illegal activities, unless their financial assets are removed. Thus, civil forfeiture intends to dismantle the economic infrastructure of drug trafficking networks. Civil forfeiture considers the property as guilty, rather than the owner, and it may exist even if there is not a criminal action. Therefore, it is claimed that police agencies have chosen easy targets, such as wealthy drug users rather than major drug traffickers. Consequently, it has been particularly challenged on the basis of the Excessive Fines, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process Clauses. The use of criminal forfeiture instead of civil forfeiture and the elimination of the equitable sharing provision are considered to be the primary solutions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tuncer, Hakki"],"institution":"University of North Texas","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Caeti, Tory J.","Fritsch, Eric J.","Tobolowsky, Peggy M., 1952-"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2002,"date_issued":"2002-08","date_published":"2002-08","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:34:52Z","subjects":["Drug control -- United States.","Forfeiture -- United States.","asset forfeiture","civil forfeiture","drugs","financial assets","war on drugs"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["Public","Copyright","Tuncer, Hakki","Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. 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