{"id":{"repo_id":"unsw","oai_identifier":"oai:unsworks.library.unsw.edu.au:1959.4/103028"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/unsw/oai:unsworks.library.unsw.edu.au:1959.4/103028","repository":{"repo_id":"unsw","name":"University of New South Wales","base_url":"https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/oai/provider"},"display":{"title":"Funds Have More to Say in Cross-border Monitoring","abstract":"In this PhD thesis, three studies were conducted on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in cross-border settings. The studies delve into the challenges U.S. mutual fund managers encounter in cross-border voting, the coordination among fund managers that helps overcome voting barriers and enhance cross-border monitoring, and the role of introduction of online voting platform in promoting cross-border voting activism in a particular country with economic significance. These three studies were made possible by the availability of U.S. mutual fund managers on the proposal level worldwide in the ISS Voting Analytics Dataset. The formal study of this thesis begins with the second chapter, which is the first empirical study in the literature to explore the changed voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers across the border and the impact of procedural voting barriers on cross-border voting activism. Significant and robust empirical evidence is found in this study that U.S. mutual fund managers’ voice is weakened across the border, with a lower voting turnout rate in shareholder meetings and a lower percentage of dissent votes against the managerial recommendations after controlling for firm and country-level characteristics, fund-manager and fund-year fixed effects. The weakened voting activism is found to be significantly associated with the presence of procedural voting barriers. This study also uses a regulatory change as an exogenous shock to analyse the impact of removing cross-border procedural voting barriers on U.S. fund managers' voting activism in EU countries. The evidence suggests significantly improved voting activism from U.S. mutual fund managers when cross-border voting barriers are removed. In the second study (Chapter 3), based on the joint holding of U.S. fund managers across different countries, the study establishes a Global Monitoring Clique measure to test how the coordination among U.S. institutional investors helps strengthen their monitoring power in cross-border holdings. The results of this study suggest that when a fund manager holds a portfolio that is more dispersedly spread across different countries and has a strong home bias in portfolio holdings, the likelihood of forming a joint monitoring connection with other funds in the home country is higher. It is also found that non-US companies with more insider controls, less information transparency, less shareholder protection, or higher voting costs attract more attention from U.S. fund managers who can coordinate with other funds from the same fund's home country. The results of this second study show that with a higher joint power of U.S. funds in the non-U.S. company, U.S. funds are less likely to exit the firm before the record dates of shareholder meetings and express their active voice. When they can coordinate with other home country funds in the cross-border setting, U.S. fund managers tend to vote against management in dissatisfying proposals more than choose to exit the firms. Forming a joint power with other fund managers overcomes the cross-border voting costs and improves the role of U.S. fund managers in cross-border monitoring. Coordinating with other fund managers also increases the likelihood of U.S. funds using voices to express dissatisfaction in firms with poor corporate governance and less information transparency, which promotes better global corporate governance standards. In the third study (Chapter 4), this thesis examines the impact of the mandatory introduction of online voting platform on foreign monitoring activities in the Chinese equity market. A difference-in-difference regression analysis is conducted based on two matched samples to test the impact of introducing the online shareholder voting platform in 2014 on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in the A-share stock market of China. Using this exogenous shock, the empirical analysis is conducted to see whether U.S. mutual fund managers increase their voices facing high state-owned firms and firms with high insider control when the cross-border voting barrier is lifted. The study also finds a more positive impact of introducing the online voting platform on U.S. mutual fund managers' voting activism in firms with information asymmetry. The significantly more significant increase in the voices of U.S. mutual funds in firms with state control or high insider control indicates that the introduction of an online voting platform enhances U.S. mutual fund managers’ monitoring activism in firms with weak shareholder protection and strong information asymmetry in China. In the process of minimising trade obstacles to foreign investors to facilitate market integration by regulators in recent decades, this study suggests that removing cross-border shareholder engagement barriers should also be on the agenda.","abstract_html":"In this PhD thesis, three studies were conducted on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in cross-border settings. The studies delve into the challenges U.S. mutual fund managers encounter in cross-border voting, the coordination among fund managers that helps overcome voting barriers and enhance cross-border monitoring, and the role of introduction of online voting platform in promoting cross-border voting activism in a particular country with economic significance. These three studies were made possible by the availability of U.S. mutual fund managers on the proposal level worldwide in the ISS Voting Analytics Dataset. The formal study of this thesis begins with the second chapter, which is the first empirical study in the literature to explore the changed voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers across the border and the impact of procedural voting barriers on cross-border voting activism. Significant and robust empirical evidence is found in this study that U.S. mutual fund managers’ voice is weakened across the border, with a lower voting turnout rate in shareholder meetings and a lower percentage of dissent votes against the managerial recommendations after controlling for firm and country-level characteristics, fund-manager and fund-year fixed effects. The weakened voting activism is found to be significantly associated with the presence of procedural voting barriers. This study also uses a regulatory change as an exogenous shock to analyse the impact of removing cross-border procedural voting barriers on U.S. fund managers' voting activism in EU countries. The evidence suggests significantly improved voting activism from U.S. mutual fund managers when cross-border voting barriers are removed. In the second study (Chapter 3), based on the joint holding of U.S. fund managers across different countries, the study establishes a Global Monitoring Clique measure to test how the coordination among U.S. institutional investors helps strengthen their monitoring power in cross-border holdings. The results of this study suggest that when a fund manager holds a portfolio that is more dispersedly spread across different countries and has a strong home bias in portfolio holdings, the likelihood of forming a joint monitoring connection with other funds in the home country is higher. It is also found that non-US companies with more insider controls, less information transparency, less shareholder protection, or higher voting costs attract more attention from U.S. fund managers who can coordinate with other funds from the same fund's home country. The results of this second study show that with a higher joint power of U.S. funds in the non-U.S. company, U.S. funds are less likely to exit the firm before the record dates of shareholder meetings and express their active voice. When they can coordinate with other home country funds in the cross-border setting, U.S. fund managers tend to vote against management in dissatisfying proposals more than choose to exit the firms. Forming a joint power with other fund managers overcomes the cross-border voting costs and improves the role of U.S. fund managers in cross-border monitoring. Coordinating with other fund managers also increases the likelihood of U.S. funds using voices to express dissatisfaction in firms with poor corporate governance and less information transparency, which promotes better global corporate governance standards. In the third study (Chapter 4), this thesis examines the impact of the mandatory introduction of online voting platform on foreign monitoring activities in the Chinese equity market. A difference-in-difference regression analysis is conducted based on two matched samples to test the impact of introducing the online shareholder voting platform in 2014 on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in the A-share stock market of China. Using this exogenous shock, the empirical analysis is conducted to see whether U.S. mutual fund managers increase their voices facing high state-owned firms and firms with high insider control when the cross-border voting barrier is lifted. The study also finds a more positive impact of introducing the online voting platform on U.S. mutual fund managers' voting activism in firms with information asymmetry. The significantly more significant increase in the voices of U.S. mutual funds in firms with state control or high insider control indicates that the introduction of an online voting platform enhances U.S. mutual fund managers’ monitoring activism in firms with weak shareholder protection and strong information asymmetry in China. In the process of minimising trade obstacles to foreign investors to facilitate market integration by regulators in recent decades, this study suggests that removing cross-border shareholder engagement barriers should also be on the agenda.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hu, Jingjing"],"institution":"UNSW, Sydney","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024","date_published":"2024","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:32:53Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["open access","CC BY 4.0","free_to_read"],"rights_urls":["https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/30502"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/30502","href":"https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/30502","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1959.4/103028","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hu, Jingjing"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["UNSW, Sydney"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["doctoral thesis","http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["open access","https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2","CC BY 4.0","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","free_to_read"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1959.4/103028","https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/bitstreams/6f4d6a54-f968-4bdf-a020-5fe2d0b09c0d/download","https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/30502"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["In this PhD thesis, three studies were conducted on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in cross-border settings. The studies delve into the challenges U.S. mutual fund managers encounter in cross-border voting, the coordination among fund managers that helps overcome voting barriers and enhance cross-border monitoring, and the role of introduction of online voting platform in promoting cross-border voting activism in a particular country with economic significance. These three studies were made possible by the availability of U.S. mutual fund managers on the proposal level worldwide in the ISS Voting Analytics Dataset. The formal study of this thesis begins with the second chapter, which is the first empirical study in the literature to explore the changed voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers across the border and the impact of procedural voting barriers on cross-border voting activism. Significant and robust empirical evidence is found in this study that U.S. mutual fund managers’ voice is weakened across the border, with a lower voting turnout rate in shareholder meetings and a lower percentage of dissent votes against the managerial recommendations after controlling for firm and country-level characteristics, fund-manager and fund-year fixed effects. The weakened voting activism is found to be significantly associated with the presence of procedural voting barriers. This study also uses a regulatory change as an exogenous shock to analyse the impact of removing cross-border procedural voting barriers on U.S. fund managers' voting activism in EU countries. The evidence suggests significantly improved voting activism from U.S. mutual fund managers when cross-border voting barriers are removed. In the second study (Chapter 3), based on the joint holding of U.S. fund managers across different countries, the study establishes a Global Monitoring Clique measure to test how the coordination among U.S. institutional investors helps strengthen their monitoring power in cross-border holdings. The results of this study suggest that when a fund manager holds a portfolio that is more dispersedly spread across different countries and has a strong home bias in portfolio holdings, the likelihood of forming a joint monitoring connection with other funds in the home country is higher. It is also found that non-US companies with more insider controls, less information transparency, less shareholder protection, or higher voting costs attract more attention from U.S. fund managers who can coordinate with other funds from the same fund's home country. The results of this second study show that with a higher joint power of U.S. funds in the non-U.S. company, U.S. funds are less likely to exit the firm before the record dates of shareholder meetings and express their active voice. When they can coordinate with other home country funds in the cross-border setting, U.S. fund managers tend to vote against management in dissatisfying proposals more than choose to exit the firms. Forming a joint power with other fund managers overcomes the cross-border voting costs and improves the role of U.S. fund managers in cross-border monitoring. Coordinating with other fund managers also increases the likelihood of U.S. funds using voices to express dissatisfaction in firms with poor corporate governance and less information transparency, which promotes better global corporate governance standards. In the third study (Chapter 4), this thesis examines the impact of the mandatory introduction of online voting platform on foreign monitoring activities in the Chinese equity market. A difference-in-difference regression analysis is conducted based on two matched samples to test the impact of introducing the online shareholder voting platform in 2014 on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in the A-share stock market of China. Using this exogenous shock, the empirical analysis is conducted to see whether U.S. mutual fund managers increase their voices facing high state-owned firms and firms with high insider control when the cross-border voting barrier is lifted. The study also finds a more positive impact of introducing the online voting platform on U.S. mutual fund managers' voting activism in firms with information asymmetry. The significantly more significant increase in the voices of U.S. mutual funds in firms with state control or high insider control indicates that the introduction of an online voting platform enhances U.S. mutual fund managers’ monitoring activism in firms with weak shareholder protection and strong information asymmetry in China. In the process of minimising trade obstacles to foreign investors to facilitate market integration by regulators in recent decades, this study suggests that removing cross-border shareholder engagement barriers should also be on the agenda."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Funds Have More to Say in Cross-border Monitoring"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Hu, Jingjing"],"dc:date":["2024"],"dc:description":["In this PhD thesis, three studies were conducted on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in cross-border settings. The studies delve into the challenges U.S. mutual fund managers encounter in cross-border voting, the coordination among fund managers that helps overcome voting barriers and enhance cross-border monitoring, and the role of introduction of online voting platform in promoting cross-border voting activism in a particular country with economic significance. These three studies were made possible by the availability of U.S. mutual fund managers on the proposal level worldwide in the ISS Voting Analytics Dataset. The formal study of this thesis begins with the second chapter, which is the first empirical study in the literature to explore the changed voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers across the border and the impact of procedural voting barriers on cross-border voting activism. Significant and robust empirical evidence is found in this study that U.S. mutual fund managers’ voice is weakened across the border, with a lower voting turnout rate in shareholder meetings and a lower percentage of dissent votes against the managerial recommendations after controlling for firm and country-level characteristics, fund-manager and fund-year fixed effects. The weakened voting activism is found to be significantly associated with the presence of procedural voting barriers. This study also uses a regulatory change as an exogenous shock to analyse the impact of removing cross-border procedural voting barriers on U.S. fund managers' voting activism in EU countries. The evidence suggests significantly improved voting activism from U.S. mutual fund managers when cross-border voting barriers are removed. In the second study (Chapter 3), based on the joint holding of U.S. fund managers across different countries, the study establishes a Global Monitoring Clique measure to test how the coordination among U.S. institutional investors helps strengthen their monitoring power in cross-border holdings. The results of this study suggest that when a fund manager holds a portfolio that is more dispersedly spread across different countries and has a strong home bias in portfolio holdings, the likelihood of forming a joint monitoring connection with other funds in the home country is higher. It is also found that non-US companies with more insider controls, less information transparency, less shareholder protection, or higher voting costs attract more attention from U.S. fund managers who can coordinate with other funds from the same fund's home country. The results of this second study show that with a higher joint power of U.S. funds in the non-U.S. company, U.S. funds are less likely to exit the firm before the record dates of shareholder meetings and express their active voice. When they can coordinate with other home country funds in the cross-border setting, U.S. fund managers tend to vote against management in dissatisfying proposals more than choose to exit the firms. Forming a joint power with other fund managers overcomes the cross-border voting costs and improves the role of U.S. fund managers in cross-border monitoring. Coordinating with other fund managers also increases the likelihood of U.S. funds using voices to express dissatisfaction in firms with poor corporate governance and less information transparency, which promotes better global corporate governance standards. In the third study (Chapter 4), this thesis examines the impact of the mandatory introduction of online voting platform on foreign monitoring activities in the Chinese equity market. A difference-in-difference regression analysis is conducted based on two matched samples to test the impact of introducing the online shareholder voting platform in 2014 on the voting activism of U.S. mutual fund managers in the A-share stock market of China. Using this exogenous shock, the empirical analysis is conducted to see whether U.S. mutual fund managers increase their voices facing high state-owned firms and firms with high insider control when the cross-border voting barrier is lifted. The study also finds a more positive impact of introducing the online voting platform on U.S. mutual fund managers' voting activism in firms with information asymmetry. The significantly more significant increase in the voices of U.S. mutual funds in firms with state control or high insider control indicates that the introduction of an online voting platform enhances U.S. mutual fund managers’ monitoring activism in firms with weak shareholder protection and strong information asymmetry in China. In the process of minimising trade obstacles to foreign investors to facilitate market integration by regulators in recent decades, this study suggests that removing cross-border shareholder engagement barriers should also be on the agenda."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/1959.4/103028","https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/bitstreams/6f4d6a54-f968-4bdf-a020-5fe2d0b09c0d/download","https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/30502"],"dc:publisher":["UNSW, Sydney"],"dc:rights":["open access","https://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2","CC BY 4.0","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","free_to_read"],"dc:title":["Funds Have More to Say in Cross-border Monitoring"],"dc:type":["doctoral thesis","http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:32:53Z"}