Minimizing the Dissatisfaction Score in the Mentor Mentee Problem Using a Variation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure

Matching games are the models for a number of economic markets. Gale and Shapley's marriage game is among the most well-known of these matching games in which the object is to pair members from two different sets, in a stable way. The marriage game is the model for building the mentor-mentee problem, a setup in which one type of player is completely matched while the other set is not. This economic market allows one to look at the dynamic of a dependent party, in this case the student, and an independent player, the mentor, who is not necessarily matched to a mentee at the end of the game and furthermore may not want one. The "Switch" and "Skip" algorithms were developed in order to create the best matching while minimizing the dissatisfaction of the mentors that preferred to be alone. Modeled from the deferred acceptance procedure, these algorithms address core principle of any matching game. The applications of these developed algorithms can be used to match professors and students in academia while providing a foundation for future matching markets.

Name thesis:degree_name

Discrete Mathematics

Level thesis:degree_level

Honors Thesis

Grantor

University of Nevada, Reno

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Forbes, Lindsey

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Quint, Thomas

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright

Language dc:language.iso

en_US, English

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3275

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarwolf.unr.edu:11714/3275