Methodology and Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the mind-body problem is often framed in terms ofthe reduction of psychology to neuroscience. In this thesis I argue that whether or notone regards such a reduction as tenable depends upon a methodological decision aboutthe importance of our naïve intuitions concerning the mind and the material world. Iclaim that standard anti-reductive argumentative strategies rest upon systematicallydeceptive and underdeveloped intuitions. As a result, we should reject these intuitionsand forms of argumentation and adopt instead a pragmatic philosophy of mind that allowsfor the principled reduction of psychology, but at the time time maintains a pluralisticmethodology.

Level thesis:degree_level

Master's Degree

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Kanzelmeyer, Jonathan C.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Nickles, Thomas J.

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Nickles, Thomas
• Williams, Christopher
• Webster, Michael

• Consciousness
• Intentionality
• Mind-body
• Pragmatism
• Psychology
• Reductionism

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright(All Rights Reserved)

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/11714/2198

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarwolf.unr.edu:11714/2198