Abstract 1:
In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.
Abstract 2:
Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.
","abstract_html":"<p><strong>Abstract 1: </strong></p> <p>In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.</p> <p><strong>Abstract 2: </strong></p> <p>Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nguyen, Huong"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Thesis-Restricted","degree_discipline":"Economics and Finance","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Tarun Mukherjee","Kabir Hassan","Arja Turunen-Red"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-12-15T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2012-12-15T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:29:47Z","subjects":["length","firm performance","quality of corporate governance","CEO turnover","CEO charateristics","quality of CEO","Corporate Finance"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1543","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Tarun Mukherjee","Kabir Hassan","Arja Turunen-Red"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Nguyen, Huong"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics and Finance"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis-Restricted"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["length","firm performance","quality of corporate governance","CEO turnover","CEO charateristics","quality of CEO","Corporate Finance"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1543"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Abstract 1:
In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.
Abstract 2:
Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Quality of Corporate Governance and the Length it Takes to Remove aPoor Performing CEO. Does performance of the former firm affect a CEO's ability to find an identical with a subsequent firm?"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Tarun Mukherjee","Kabir Hassan","Arja Turunen-Red"],"dc:creator":["Nguyen, Huong"],"dc:description.abstract":["Abstract 1:
In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance. We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.
Abstract 2:
Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in performance of their new employers.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1543"],"dc:subject":["length","firm performance","quality of corporate governance","CEO turnover","CEO charateristics","quality of CEO","Corporate Finance"],"dc:title":["The Quality of Corporate Governance and the Length it Takes to Remove aPoor Performing CEO. Does performance of the former firm affect a CEO's ability to find an identical with a subsequent firm?"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics and Finance"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis-Restricted"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:29:47Z"}