The Berlin Crisis of 1958/59: A Case of Pragmatic Restraint

This paper examines the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis as a diplomatic experience, conducted by the U.S. and U.S.S.R as an alternative to war. Both nations had nuclear weapon capabilities that could transform a local conflict into general war. The potential for disaster, plus other limits, made a series of diplomatic encounters the only productive option. The diplomatic course also shielded American and Russian interests indirectly related to the conflict. Each nation and its leader had pragmatic reasons for practicing restraint. These included conservation of assets, political stability, and most importantly, poor chances for sustainable gains. Limited war doctrine was influential in establishing these policies.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.A.

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

History

Year

2006

Author dc:creator

• Williamson, Richard D.

Contributors dc:contributor

• Bischof, Gunter
• Altman, Ida

• Eisenhower
• Limited-war
• Dulles
• Diplomatic
• Berlin

Repository record dc:identifier

https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/340

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-1373