{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/97706"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/97706","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Reputation in continuous-time games with multiple commitment types","abstract":"We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs.","abstract_html":"We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ryu, Seokjong"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Williams, Steven R.","Cho, In-Koo","Perry, Martin K.","Lemus, Jorge"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-08-10T20:32:56Z","date_published":"2017-08-10T20:32:56Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:34Z","subjects":["Reputation","Continuous-time games","Multiple commitment types"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2017 Seokjong Ryu"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/97706","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Williams, Steven R.","Cho, In-Koo","Perry, Martin K.","Lemus, Jorge"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ryu, Seokjong"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2017-08-10T20:32:56Z","2019-08-11T09:15:35Z","2017-04-17","2017-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Reputation","Continuous-time games","Multiple commitment types"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2017 Seokjong Ryu"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/97706"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2019-05-01","The student, Seokjong Ryu, accepted the attached license on 2017-04-14 at 14:49.","The student, Seokjong Ryu, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2017-04-14 at 14:51.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2017-04-17 at 09:14.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #10764 on 2017-08-10 at 15:05:37","Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-10T20:32:56Z (GMT). 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We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2019-05-01","The student, Seokjong Ryu, accepted the attached license on 2017-04-14 at 14:49.","The student, Seokjong Ryu, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2017-04-14 at 14:51.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2017-04-17 at 09:14.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #10764 on 2017-08-10 at 15:05:37","Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-10T20:32:56Z (GMT). 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