{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/90542"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/90542","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Robustness of the k-double auction under Knightian uncertainty","abstract":"This dissertation considers the robustness of private value and common value k-double auctions when those markets are populated by regret minimizers. Regret minimizing agents, unlike typical expected utility maximizers, need not commit to a single prior in their decision rule. In fact, it is a feature of the minimax regret decision rule that is not based on any prior. This makes the decision rule an interesting one for agents who face Knightian Uncertainty. A decision problem involves Knightian uncertainty if the agents know the possible outcomes but not those outcomes' probabilities -- as may be the case in a new market. This dissertation shows that in a private value k-double auction, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking behavior as the market grows. Similarly, in a common value auction, traders' behavior may depend on the parameter k, but does not depend on the number of other traders in the market. The invariance of regret minimizing traders' strategies to the size of the markets they inhabit is not an accident of the sealed bid double auction institution. In fact, it is a consequence of the symmetry axiom. The final chapter in this dissertation shows that any agents in a k-double auction who use decision rules that accord with the symmetry axiom, then their bids and asks will not depend on the number of rival traders.","abstract_html":"This dissertation considers the robustness of private value and common value k-double auctions when those markets are populated by regret minimizers. Regret minimizing agents, unlike typical expected utility maximizers, need not commit to a single prior in their decision rule. In fact, it is a feature of the minimax regret decision rule that is not based on any prior. This makes the decision rule an interesting one for agents who face Knightian Uncertainty. A decision problem involves Knightian uncertainty if the agents know the possible outcomes but not those outcomes' probabilities -- as may be the case in a new market. This dissertation shows that in a private value k-double auction, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking behavior as the market grows. Similarly, in a common value auction, traders' behavior may depend on the parameter k, but does not depend on the number of other traders in the market. The invariance of regret minimizing traders' strategies to the size of the markets they inhabit is not an accident of the sealed bid double auction institution. In fact, it is a consequence of the symmetry axiom. The final chapter in this dissertation shows that any agents in a k-double auction who use decision rules that accord with the symmetry axiom, then their bids and asks will not depend on the number of rival traders.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Shafer, Rachel C"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Williams, Steven R.","Cho, In-Koo","Deltas, George","Perry, Martin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-07-07T19:53:54Z","date_published":"2016-07-07T19:53:54Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:32Z","subjects":["Double Auctions","Regret Minimization","Knightian Uncertainty","Decision Theory","Mechanism Design"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2016 Rachel Shafer"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90542","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Williams, Steven R.","Cho, In-Koo","Deltas, George","Perry, Martin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Shafer, Rachel C"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2016-07-07T19:53:54Z","2016-04-20","2016-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Double Auctions","Regret Minimization","Knightian Uncertainty","Decision Theory","Mechanism Design"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2016 Rachel Shafer"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90542"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation considers the robustness of private value and common value k-double auctions when those markets are populated by regret minimizers. Regret minimizing agents, unlike typical expected utility maximizers, need not commit to a single prior in their decision rule. In fact, it is a feature of the minimax regret decision rule that is not based on any prior. This makes the decision rule an interesting one for agents who face Knightian Uncertainty. A decision problem involves Knightian uncertainty if the agents know the possible outcomes but not those outcomes' probabilities -- as may be the case in a new market. This dissertation shows that in a private value k-double auction, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking behavior as the market grows. Similarly, in a common value auction, traders' behavior may depend on the parameter k, but does not depend on the number of other traders in the market. The invariance of regret minimizing traders' strategies to the size of the markets they inhabit is not an accident of the sealed bid double auction institution. In fact, it is a consequence of the symmetry axiom. The final chapter in this dissertation shows that any agents in a k-double auction who use decision rules that accord with the symmetry axiom, then their bids and asks will not depend on the number of rival traders.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-07-07 without embargo terms","The student, Rachel Shafer, accepted the attached license on 2016-04-14 at 16:53.","The student, Rachel Shafer, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2016-04-15 at 17:55.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2016-04-20 at 10:16.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #9230 on 2016-07-07 at 13:30:47","Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-07T19:53:54Z (GMT). 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In fact, it is a feature of the minimax regret decision rule that is not based on any prior. This makes the decision rule an interesting one for agents who face Knightian Uncertainty. A decision problem involves Knightian uncertainty if the agents know the possible outcomes but not those outcomes' probabilities -- as may be the case in a new market. This dissertation shows that in a private value k-double auction, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking behavior as the market grows. Similarly, in a common value auction, traders' behavior may depend on the parameter k, but does not depend on the number of other traders in the market. The invariance of regret minimizing traders' strategies to the size of the markets they inhabit is not an accident of the sealed bid double auction institution. In fact, it is a consequence of the symmetry axiom. The final chapter in this dissertation shows that any agents in a k-double auction who use decision rules that accord with the symmetry axiom, then their bids and asks will not depend on the number of rival traders.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-07-07 without embargo terms","The student, Rachel Shafer, accepted the attached license on 2016-04-14 at 16:53.","The student, Rachel Shafer, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2016-04-15 at 17:55.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2016-04-20 at 10:16.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #9230 on 2016-07-07 at 13:30:47","Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-07T19:53:54Z (GMT). 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