{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/89001"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/89001","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Three essays in economics and finance","abstract":"\"This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is joint work with Dan Bernhardt. We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly, and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first suppose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal to the asset's stand-alone value to the seller. Demarzo et al. (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. In the second essay, I consider a situation in which a winning bidder of an equity auction has an investment opportunity after the auction and the seller has private information about the return of the post-auction investment. I show that in such a situation, in contrast to the seminal \"\"linkage principle\"\" by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the seller's expected revenue may be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than when committing to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it is positive or negative. The third essay is joint work with Keiichi Kawai. The securitization of structured finance products entails three types of inefficiency: the issuer's moral hazard when screening underlying assets (ex-ante inefficiency), the issuer's incentive to repackage underlying assets into separate securities even when doing so is socially inefficient (interim inefficiency), and adverse selection in the market (ex-post inefficiency). To analyze the interplay of these inefficiencies and their welfare implications, we consider a situation wherein buying medium-value assets and issuing medium-value securities are first-best. However, we show that the issuer not only buys low-value underlying assets but also repackages underlying assets to issue two types of securities of different values despite paying a socially wasteful cost.\"","abstract_html":""This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is joint work with Dan Bernhardt. We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly, and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first suppose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal to the asset's stand-alone value to the seller. Demarzo et al. (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. In the second essay, I consider a situation in which a winning bidder of an equity auction has an investment opportunity after the auction and the seller has private information about the return of the post-auction investment. I show that in such a situation, in contrast to the seminal ""linkage principle"" by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the seller's expected revenue may be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than when committing to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it is positive or negative. The third essay is joint work with Keiichi Kawai. The securitization of structured finance products entails three types of inefficiency: the issuer's moral hazard when screening underlying assets (ex-ante inefficiency), the issuer's incentive to repackage underlying assets into separate securities even when doing so is socially inefficient (interim inefficiency), and adverse selection in the market (ex-post inefficiency). To analyze the interplay of these inefficiencies and their welfare implications, we consider a situation wherein buying medium-value assets and issuing medium-value securities are first-best. However, we show that the issuer not only buys low-value underlying assets but also repackages underlying assets to issue two types of securities of different values despite paying a socially wasteful cost."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sogo, Takeharu"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Bernhardt, Dan M","Perry, Martin K","Williams, Steven R","Deltas, George"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-03-02T19:33:48Z","date_published":"2016-03-02T19:33:48Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:32Z","subjects":["Auctions with participation costs","Security-bid auctions","Entry","Information disclosure","Equity auctions","Post-auction investment decisions","Endogenous quality choice","Securitization","Structured finance products","Moral hazard","Adverse selection"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2015 Takeharu Sogo"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89001","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Bernhardt, Dan M","Perry, Martin K","Williams, Steven R","Deltas, George"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sogo, Takeharu"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2016-03-02T19:33:48Z","2015-11-23","2015-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Auctions with participation costs","Security-bid auctions","Entry","Information disclosure","Equity auctions","Post-auction investment decisions","Endogenous quality choice","Securitization","Structured finance products","Moral hazard","Adverse selection"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2015 Takeharu Sogo"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89001"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is joint work with Dan Bernhardt. We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly, and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first suppose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal to the asset's stand-alone value to the seller. Demarzo et al. (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. In the second essay, I consider a situation in which a winning bidder of an equity auction has an investment opportunity after the auction and the seller has private information about the return of the post-auction investment. I show that in such a situation, in contrast to the seminal \"\"linkage principle\"\" by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the seller's expected revenue may be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than when committing to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it is positive or negative. The third essay is joint work with Keiichi Kawai. The securitization of structured finance products entails three types of inefficiency: the issuer's moral hazard when screening underlying assets (ex-ante inefficiency), the issuer's incentive to repackage underlying assets into separate securities even when doing so is socially inefficient (interim inefficiency), and adverse selection in the market (ex-post inefficiency). To analyze the interplay of these inefficiencies and their welfare implications, we consider a situation wherein buying medium-value assets and issuing medium-value securities are first-best. However, we show that the issuer not only buys low-value underlying assets but also repackages underlying assets to issue two types of securities of different values despite paying a socially wasteful cost.\"","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-03-02 without embargo terms","The student, Takeharu Sogo, accepted the attached license on 2015-11-21 at 02:35.","The student, Takeharu Sogo, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2015-11-21 at 02:58.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2015-11-23 at 13:23.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #8819 on 2016-03-02 at 12:50:18","Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-02T19:33:48Z (GMT). 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We first suppose that the minimum reserve security-bid yields the seller an expected revenue equal to the asset's stand-alone value to the seller. Demarzo et al. (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. In the second essay, I consider a situation in which a winning bidder of an equity auction has an investment opportunity after the auction and the seller has private information about the return of the post-auction investment. I show that in such a situation, in contrast to the seminal \"\"linkage principle\"\" by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the seller's expected revenue may be higher when not disclosing her private information at all than when committing to publicly announce her private information regardless of whether it is positive or negative. The third essay is joint work with Keiichi Kawai. The securitization of structured finance products entails three types of inefficiency: the issuer's moral hazard when screening underlying assets (ex-ante inefficiency), the issuer's incentive to repackage underlying assets into separate securities even when doing so is socially inefficient (interim inefficiency), and adverse selection in the market (ex-post inefficiency). To analyze the interplay of these inefficiencies and their welfare implications, we consider a situation wherein buying medium-value assets and issuing medium-value securities are first-best. However, we show that the issuer not only buys low-value underlying assets but also repackages underlying assets to issue two types of securities of different values despite paying a socially wasteful cost.\"","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-03-02 without embargo terms","The student, Takeharu Sogo, accepted the attached license on 2015-11-21 at 02:35.","The student, Takeharu Sogo, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2015-11-21 at 02:58.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2015-11-23 at 13:23.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #8819 on 2016-03-02 at 12:50:18","Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-02T19:33:48Z (GMT). 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