{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/88959"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/88959","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Multi-period demand response management in the smart grid: a Stackelberg game approach","abstract":"This thesis studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for a user to participate is provided. The large population regime is also investigated and an appropriate company-to-user ratio is provided.","abstract_html":"This thesis studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for a user to participate is provided. The large population regime is also investigated and an appropriate company-to-user ratio is provided.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Alshehri, Khaled Mohammed A"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Basar, Tamer"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-03-02T19:33:19Z","date_published":"2016-03-02T19:33:19Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:32Z","subjects":["Smart Grid","Game Theory"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2015 Khaled Alshehri"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88959","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Basar, Tamer"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Alshehri, Khaled Mohammed A"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2016-03-02T19:33:19Z","2015-10-30","2015-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Smart Grid","Game Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2015 Khaled Alshehri"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88959"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This thesis studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for a user to participate is provided. The large population regime is also investigated and an appropriate company-to-user ratio is provided.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-03-02 without embargo terms","The student, Khaled Alshehri, accepted the attached license on 2015-10-28 at 13:13.","The student, Khaled Alshehri, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2015-10-28 at 17:17.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2015-10-30 at 13:36.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #8717 on 2016-03-02 at 12:49:29","Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-02T19:33:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 ALSHEHRI-THESIS-2015.pdf: 411812 bytes, checksum: da008bb376644f24a9265f1808a1b38a (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4212 bytes, checksum: 0c99b88953ab05fc7485a4c1459f8901 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-30"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Multi-period demand response management in the smart grid: a Stackelberg game approach"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Basar, Tamer"],"dc:creator":["Alshehri, Khaled Mohammed A"],"dc:date":["2016-03-02T19:33:19Z","2015-10-30","2015-12"],"dc:description":["This thesis studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility companies. It is shown, both analytically and numerically, that the multi-period scheme, compared with the single-period one, provides more incentives for energy consumers to participate in demand response programs. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for a user to participate is provided. The large population regime is also investigated and an appropriate company-to-user ratio is provided.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2016-03-02 without embargo terms","The student, Khaled Alshehri, accepted the attached license on 2015-10-28 at 13:13.","The student, Khaled Alshehri, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2015-10-28 at 17:17.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2015-10-30 at 13:36.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #8717 on 2016-03-02 at 12:49:29","Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-02T19:33:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 ALSHEHRI-THESIS-2015.pdf: 411812 bytes, checksum: da008bb376644f24a9265f1808a1b38a (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4212 bytes, checksum: 0c99b88953ab05fc7485a4c1459f8901 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-30"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88959"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2015 Khaled Alshehri"],"dc:subject":["Smart Grid","Game Theory"],"dc:title":["Multi-period demand response management in the smart grid: a Stackelberg game approach"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical & Computer Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:32Z"}