{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87916"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87916","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Essays on Economic Aspects of Corruption","abstract":"In the last part, an exercise which uses a natural resource extraction model to theoretically examine corrupt privatization is presented. Corrupt officials have been known to use their authority to manipulate the privatization process in return for private benefits. The optimal time path of privatization by corrupt officials is found and its consequences are discussed. Then the effects of decentralizing the privatization process are analyzed. The model indicates that decentralization decreases the total privatization time. 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