{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87599"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87599","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Nature and Origin of Moral Agency in Mammalia","abstract":"Moral philosophers often claim that animals lack the basic capacities needed for morality. However, with no account that states the minimal requirements for being a moral agent, that claim is vulnerable. After developing such an account, the dissertation shows that many species of mammals satisfy the minimal requirements for moral agency---specialized emotional capacities that emerge from early attachment processes and motivate moral behavior in humans and other mammals. Additionally, the absence of these emotional capacities explains the absence of moral agency---psychopathy, in humans and other mammals. Making a clear case that mammals possess moral agency has importance for philosophical ethics, philosophical psychology, empirical thought and research, and societal beliefs and practices.","abstract_html":"Moral philosophers often claim that animals lack the basic capacities needed for morality. However, with no account that states the minimal requirements for being a moral agent, that claim is vulnerable. After developing such an account, the dissertation shows that many species of mammals satisfy the minimal requirements for moral agency---specialized emotional capacities that emerge from early attachment processes and motivate moral behavior in humans and other mammals. Additionally, the absence of these emotional capacities explains the absence of moral agency---psychopathy, in humans and other mammals. Making a clear case that mammals possess moral agency has importance for philosophical ethics, philosophical psychology, empirical thought and research, and societal beliefs and practices.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Reid, Mark D."],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["James Wallace"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-28T16:20:51Z","date_published":"2015-09-28T16:20:51Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:30Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3250315"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3250315","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87599","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["James Wallace"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Reid, Mark D."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-28T16:20:51Z","10000-01-01","2006"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87599","(MiAaPQ)AAI3250315"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Moral philosophers often claim that animals lack the basic capacities needed for morality. However, with no account that states the minimal requirements for being a moral agent, that claim is vulnerable. After developing such an account, the dissertation shows that many species of mammals satisfy the minimal requirements for moral agency---specialized emotional capacities that emerge from early attachment processes and motivate moral behavior in humans and other mammals. Additionally, the absence of these emotional capacities explains the absence of moral agency---psychopathy, in humans and other mammals. Making a clear case that mammals possess moral agency has importance for philosophical ethics, philosophical psychology, empirical thought and research, and societal beliefs and practices.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:20:51Z (GMT). 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After developing such an account, the dissertation shows that many species of mammals satisfy the minimal requirements for moral agency---specialized emotional capacities that emerge from early attachment processes and motivate moral behavior in humans and other mammals. Additionally, the absence of these emotional capacities explains the absence of moral agency---psychopathy, in humans and other mammals. Making a clear case that mammals possess moral agency has importance for philosophical ethics, philosophical psychology, empirical thought and research, and societal beliefs and practices.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:20:51Z (GMT). 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