{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87426"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87426","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Two Essays in Corporate Finance and Investment","abstract":"\"The second essay, \"\"Dual-class Stocks: Motivation and Effects on Firm Valuation, Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Payout Policy\"\", addresses several issues in dual-class stocks: why and when firms create dual-class stocks, and how the creation of dual-class stocks affects shareholders' wealth, corporate governance, capital structure, and payout policy. The results suggest that managers adopt the dual-class equity structure to raise additional outside equity capital without losing their control of the firms, rather than an antitakover measure. Adopting dual-class structure has a negative effect on shareholders' wealth that is observable only over a long horizon of time after the change. Dual-class firms tend to have board of directors that provide less effective monitoring roles for outside shareholders even before the change. They tend to keep the composition after the dual-class creation. The results suggest that over a long horizon of time, dual-class firms tend to use equity more than debt for their external capital source. No significant difference in dividend payout policy between dual-class firms and their industry and size matched firms is found.\"","abstract_html":""The second essay, ""Dual-class Stocks: Motivation and Effects on Firm Valuation, Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Payout Policy"", addresses several issues in dual-class stocks: why and when firms create dual-class stocks, and how the creation of dual-class stocks affects shareholders' wealth, corporate governance, capital structure, and payout policy. The results suggest that managers adopt the dual-class equity structure to raise additional outside equity capital without losing their control of the firms, rather than an antitakover measure. Adopting dual-class structure has a negative effect on shareholders' wealth that is observable only over a long horizon of time after the change. Dual-class firms tend to have board of directors that provide less effective monitoring roles for outside shareholders even before the change. They tend to keep the composition after the dual-class creation. The results suggest that over a long horizon of time, dual-class firms tend to use equity more than debt for their external capital source. No significant difference in dividend payout policy between dual-class firms and their industry and size matched firms is found."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, Joonghyuk"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Finance","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Narasimhan Jegadeesh"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-28T16:03:12Z","date_published":"2015-09-28T16:03:12Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:30Z","subjects":["Economics, Finance"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3023093"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3023093","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87426","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Narasimhan Jegadeesh"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kim, Joonghyuk"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-28T16:03:12Z","10000-01-01","2001"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Finance"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Finance"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87426","(MiAaPQ)AAI3023093"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"The second essay, \"\"Dual-class Stocks: Motivation and Effects on Firm Valuation, Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Payout Policy\"\", addresses several issues in dual-class stocks: why and when firms create dual-class stocks, and how the creation of dual-class stocks affects shareholders' wealth, corporate governance, capital structure, and payout policy. The results suggest that managers adopt the dual-class equity structure to raise additional outside equity capital without losing their control of the firms, rather than an antitakover measure. Adopting dual-class structure has a negative effect on shareholders' wealth that is observable only over a long horizon of time after the change. Dual-class firms tend to have board of directors that provide less effective monitoring roles for outside shareholders even before the change. They tend to keep the composition after the dual-class creation. The results suggest that over a long horizon of time, dual-class firms tend to use equity more than debt for their external capital source. No significant difference in dividend payout policy between dual-class firms and their industry and size matched firms is found.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:03:12Z (GMT). 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The results suggest that managers adopt the dual-class equity structure to raise additional outside equity capital without losing their control of the firms, rather than an antitakover measure. Adopting dual-class structure has a negative effect on shareholders' wealth that is observable only over a long horizon of time after the change. Dual-class firms tend to have board of directors that provide less effective monitoring roles for outside shareholders even before the change. They tend to keep the composition after the dual-class creation. The results suggest that over a long horizon of time, dual-class firms tend to use equity more than debt for their external capital source. No significant difference in dividend payout policy between dual-class firms and their industry and size matched firms is found.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:03:12Z (GMT). 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