{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85628"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85628","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Existence of Efficient Mechanisms in Bilateral Trade Models: The Effects of Different Distributions of Types, Preferences and Initial Endowments","abstract":"88 p.","abstract_html":"88 p.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Oliveira, Andre Rossi"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Williams, Steven R."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T22:47:40Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T22:47:40Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z","subjects":["Economics, Theory"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI9834723"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI9834723","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85628","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Williams, Steven R."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Oliveira, Andre Rossi"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T22:47:40Z","10000-01-01","1998"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85628","(MiAaPQ)AAI9834723"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["88 p.","\"In a model of bilateral trade with continuous quantities and quasilinear utilities, a well-known necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of ex post efficient mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex ante budget-balancing and interim individual rationality is reconsidered. This condition involves the comparison of the expected gains from trade of different types of agents, and therefore depends on their probability distributions. It also depends on the agents' initial endowments due to the requirement of individual rationality. This dissertation studies the issue of how different distributions of types and initial endowments affect this condition and therefore existence. It is first shown that mechanisms satisfying the conditions above exist when the likelihood of the types of agents that can achieve the highest gains from trade is sufficiently small. Conversely, non-existence is the outcome when the types that achieve the lowest gains from trade receive low probabilities. The result is interpreted in terms of the relationship between the expected revenue of the mechanism and the participation fees the agents are charged. It is then shown, for fixed probability distributions, that efficient mechanisms exist when the initial endowments are sufficiently distant from any efficient allocation, and that they don't exist when the initial endowments are close to the efficient allocation to the \"\"worst off\"\" types of agents.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9834723.pdf: 2829262 bytes, checksum: 7063886194501d2152cfd7d59e475dcc (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86909 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Existence of Efficient Mechanisms in Bilateral Trade Models: The Effects of Different Distributions of Types, Preferences and Initial Endowments"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Williams, Steven R."],"dc:creator":["Oliveira, Andre Rossi"],"dc:date":["2015-09-25T22:47:40Z","10000-01-01","1998"],"dc:description":["88 p.","\"In a model of bilateral trade with continuous quantities and quasilinear utilities, a well-known necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of ex post efficient mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex ante budget-balancing and interim individual rationality is reconsidered. This condition involves the comparison of the expected gains from trade of different types of agents, and therefore depends on their probability distributions. It also depends on the agents' initial endowments due to the requirement of individual rationality. This dissertation studies the issue of how different distributions of types and initial endowments affect this condition and therefore existence. It is first shown that mechanisms satisfying the conditions above exist when the likelihood of the types of agents that can achieve the highest gains from trade is sufficiently small. Conversely, non-existence is the outcome when the types that achieve the lowest gains from trade receive low probabilities. The result is interpreted in terms of the relationship between the expected revenue of the mechanism and the participation fees the agents are charged. It is then shown, for fixed probability distributions, that efficient mechanisms exist when the initial endowments are sufficiently distant from any efficient allocation, and that they don't exist when the initial endowments are close to the efficient allocation to the \"\"worst off\"\" types of agents.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9834723.pdf: 2829262 bytes, checksum: 7063886194501d2152cfd7d59e475dcc (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86909 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85628","(MiAaPQ)AAI9834723"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Economics, Theory"],"dc:title":["Existence of Efficient Mechanisms in Bilateral Trade Models: The Effects of Different Distributions of Types, Preferences and Initial Endowments"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z"}