{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85584"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85584","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Essays on Public Choice","abstract":"In the third paper we consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official, who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and opportunity cost. They observe the wage, decide whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign for winning the election. A higher wage makes more able candidates to enter, while both able and inept candidates campaign harder for the office. We analyze the optimal remuneration for the officials that maximizes ordinary citizens' expected utility.","abstract_html":"In the third paper we consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official, who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and opportunity cost. They observe the wage, decide whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign for winning the election. A higher wage makes more able candidates to enter, while both able and inept candidates campaign harder for the office. 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