{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85574"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85574","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Two Essays on Electricity Markets: Entry Into Hydroelectric Generation Industry and the Political Cycle of Regulated Prices","abstract":"The second chapter deals with the problem of the political cycle in regulated industries. It follows Paiva (1995) in combining elements of both the political cycle approach of Rogoff and Sibert and the political theory of regulation of Peltzman: the idea that policy decisions may change with the proximity of elections is borrowed from the political business cycle theory and added to enhance the traditional, static models of political regulation. More specifically, I combine the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) to model the regulator's problem as a signaling game where politicians set the regulated price trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry falls in periods immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in regulated industries, this paper empirically test this theory. Using quarterly data from 35 industrial and developing countries over the period 1978-2004, I find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between elections and electricity prices.","abstract_html":"The second chapter deals with the problem of the political cycle in regulated industries. It follows Paiva (1995) in combining elements of both the political cycle approach of Rogoff and Sibert and the political theory of regulation of Peltzman: the idea that policy decisions may change with the proximity of elections is borrowed from the political business cycle theory and added to enhance the traditional, static models of political regulation. More specifically, I combine the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) to model the regulator's problem as a signaling game where politicians set the regulated price trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry falls in periods immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in regulated industries, this paper empirically test this theory. Using quarterly data from 35 industrial and developing countries over the period 1978-2004, I find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between elections and electricity prices.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simoes"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Leonardo Rezende"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z","subjects":["Energy"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3242943"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3242943","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85574","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Leonardo Rezende"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simoes"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","10000-01-01","2006"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Energy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85574","(MiAaPQ)AAI3242943"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The second chapter deals with the problem of the political cycle in regulated industries. It follows Paiva (1995) in combining elements of both the political cycle approach of Rogoff and Sibert and the political theory of regulation of Peltzman: the idea that policy decisions may change with the proximity of elections is borrowed from the political business cycle theory and added to enhance the traditional, static models of political regulation. More specifically, I combine the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) to model the regulator's problem as a signaling game where politicians set the regulated price trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry falls in periods immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in regulated industries, this paper empirically test this theory. Using quarterly data from 35 industrial and developing countries over the period 1978-2004, I find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between elections and electricity prices.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3242943.pdf: 1662028 bytes, checksum: ebf263029bf3c6ce62c942680919264a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86855 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","66 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Two Essays on Electricity Markets: Entry Into Hydroelectric Generation Industry and the Political Cycle of Regulated Prices"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Leonardo Rezende"],"dc:creator":["Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simoes"],"dc:date":["2015-09-25T22:47:27Z","10000-01-01","2006"],"dc:description":["The second chapter deals with the problem of the political cycle in regulated industries. It follows Paiva (1995) in combining elements of both the political cycle approach of Rogoff and Sibert and the political theory of regulation of Peltzman: the idea that policy decisions may change with the proximity of elections is borrowed from the political business cycle theory and added to enhance the traditional, static models of political regulation. More specifically, I combine the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) to model the regulator's problem as a signaling game where politicians set the regulated price trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry falls in periods immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in regulated industries, this paper empirically test this theory. Using quarterly data from 35 industrial and developing countries over the period 1978-2004, I find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between elections and electricity prices.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3242943.pdf: 1662028 bytes, checksum: ebf263029bf3c6ce62c942680919264a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86855 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","66 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85574","(MiAaPQ)AAI3242943"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Energy"],"dc:title":["Two Essays on Electricity Markets: Entry Into Hydroelectric Generation Industry and the Political Cycle of Regulated Prices"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:25Z"}