{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/82551"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/82551","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Never -Ending Conflicts? Transfers, Partitions, and Unifications as Potential Solutions for Territorial Disputes","abstract":"Historically, territorial dispute has been the single most contentious issue over which states fight. This project investigates the related questions of whether and under what circumstances an alteration of international borders---that is a territorial change that takes the form of a state-to-state territorial transfer, partition of a single country, or unification of two or more countries---can prevent future violence, and in that sense manage the underlying territorial dispute. A model linking territorial changes and future militarized conflicts between the participant countries is developed. The model posits that the decision to use force to alter the outcome of the preceding change depends (1) on the combination of relative power and the (still) disputed land's tangible (strategic, economic) or intangible (ethnic, religious) value and (2) on the process of territorial change (peaceful, violent). The first part of the model evaluates the likely benefits of using force to pursue further territorial revisions; the second part notes the potential costs of such actions. The model applies to both territorial winners and losers, that is countries that have gained and lost the land, respectively, through the change. The roles of foreign policy similarity and domestic constraints are also considered. The model is empirically assessed on all 20th century territorial changes. Results show that while most participant countries do not fight one another after the change, those countries that fight do so at explosively high rates. Moreover, the results largely support the proposed theoretical connection, explaining the variation in the changes' aftermath.","abstract_html":"Historically, territorial dispute has been the single most contentious issue over which states fight. This project investigates the related questions of whether and under what circumstances an alteration of international borders---that is a territorial change that takes the form of a state-to-state territorial transfer, partition of a single country, or unification of two or more countries---can prevent future violence, and in that sense manage the underlying territorial dispute. A model linking territorial changes and future militarized conflicts between the participant countries is developed. The model posits that the decision to use force to alter the outcome of the preceding change depends (1) on the combination of relative power and the (still) disputed land's tangible (strategic, economic) or intangible (ethnic, religious) value and (2) on the process of territorial change (peaceful, violent). The first part of the model evaluates the likely benefits of using force to pursue further territorial revisions; the second part notes the potential costs of such actions. The model applies to both territorial winners and losers, that is countries that have gained and lost the land, respectively, through the change. The roles of foreign policy similarity and domestic constraints are also considered. The model is empirically assessed on all 20th century territorial changes. Results show that while most participant countries do not fight one another after the change, those countries that fight do so at explosively high rates. Moreover, the results largely support the proposed theoretical connection, explaining the variation in the changes' aftermath.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tir, Jaroslav"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Diehl, Paul F."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-09-25T20:49:14Z","date_published":"2015-09-25T20:49:14Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:18Z","subjects":["Political Science, International Law and Relations"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(MiAaPQ)AAI3023215"],"render_values":[{"text":"(MiAaPQ)AAI3023215","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82551","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Diehl, Paul F."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Tir, Jaroslav"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-09-25T20:49:14Z","10000-01-01","2001"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political Science, International Law and Relations"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82551","(MiAaPQ)AAI3023215"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Historically, territorial dispute has been the single most contentious issue over which states fight. This project investigates the related questions of whether and under what circumstances an alteration of international borders---that is a territorial change that takes the form of a state-to-state territorial transfer, partition of a single country, or unification of two or more countries---can prevent future violence, and in that sense manage the underlying territorial dispute. A model linking territorial changes and future militarized conflicts between the participant countries is developed. The model posits that the decision to use force to alter the outcome of the preceding change depends (1) on the combination of relative power and the (still) disputed land's tangible (strategic, economic) or intangible (ethnic, religious) value and (2) on the process of territorial change (peaceful, violent). The first part of the model evaluates the likely benefits of using force to pursue further territorial revisions; the second part notes the potential costs of such actions. The model applies to both territorial winners and losers, that is countries that have gained and lost the land, respectively, through the change. The roles of foreign policy similarity and domestic constraints are also considered. The model is empirically assessed on all 20th century territorial changes. Results show that while most participant countries do not fight one another after the change, those countries that fight do so at explosively high rates. Moreover, the results largely support the proposed theoretical connection, explaining the variation in the changes' aftermath.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:49:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3023215.pdf: 13784508 bytes, checksum: 48df4eff45931fdddc0a6257479945ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 83832 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","209 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Never -Ending Conflicts? Transfers, Partitions, and Unifications as Potential Solutions for Territorial Disputes"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Diehl, Paul F."],"dc:creator":["Tir, Jaroslav"],"dc:date":["2015-09-25T20:49:14Z","10000-01-01","2001"],"dc:description":["Historically, territorial dispute has been the single most contentious issue over which states fight. This project investigates the related questions of whether and under what circumstances an alteration of international borders---that is a territorial change that takes the form of a state-to-state territorial transfer, partition of a single country, or unification of two or more countries---can prevent future violence, and in that sense manage the underlying territorial dispute. A model linking territorial changes and future militarized conflicts between the participant countries is developed. The model posits that the decision to use force to alter the outcome of the preceding change depends (1) on the combination of relative power and the (still) disputed land's tangible (strategic, economic) or intangible (ethnic, religious) value and (2) on the process of territorial change (peaceful, violent). The first part of the model evaluates the likely benefits of using force to pursue further territorial revisions; the second part notes the potential costs of such actions. The model applies to both territorial winners and losers, that is countries that have gained and lost the land, respectively, through the change. The roles of foreign policy similarity and domestic constraints are also considered. The model is empirically assessed on all 20th century territorial changes. Results show that while most participant countries do not fight one another after the change, those countries that fight do so at explosively high rates. Moreover, the results largely support the proposed theoretical connection, explaining the variation in the changes' aftermath.","Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:49:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3023215.pdf: 13784508 bytes, checksum: 48df4eff45931fdddc0a6257479945ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 83832 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","209 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82551","(MiAaPQ)AAI3023215"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:subject":["Political Science, International Law and Relations"],"dc:title":["Never -Ending Conflicts? Transfers, Partitions, and Unifications as Potential Solutions for Territorial Disputes"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:18Z"}