{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/78388"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/78388","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The effects of contract framing on misconduct","abstract":"This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.","abstract_html":"This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nichol, Jennifer Eve"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Accountancy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Chen, Clara","Peecher, Mark","Autrey, Romana","Mahoney, Joseph"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-07-22T22:16:48Z","date_published":"2015-07-22T22:16:48Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:11Z","subjects":["Contract framing","Misreporting"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2015 Jennifer Nichol"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/78388","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Chen, Clara","Peecher, Mark","Autrey, Romana","Mahoney, Joseph"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Nichol, Jennifer Eve"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-07-22T22:16:48Z","2015-05","2015-04-16","2015-5"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Accountancy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Contract framing","Misreporting"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2015 Jennifer Nichol"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/78388"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2015-07-22 without embargo terms","The student, Jennifer Nichol, accepted the attached license on 2015-04-14 at 19:36.","The student, Jennifer Nichol, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2015-04-14 at 19:42.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2015-04-16 at 09:00.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #7861 on 2015-07-22 at 10:32:03","Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T22:16:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 NICHOL-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf: 744782 bytes, checksum: 9ece162a58d27f537253a848c13b138b (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4212 bytes, checksum: 253ba4149aa426bdae3c169c1a5b19fd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-16"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The effects of contract framing on misconduct"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Chen, Clara","Peecher, Mark","Autrey, Romana","Mahoney, Joseph"],"dc:creator":["Nichol, Jennifer Eve"],"dc:date":["2015-07-22T22:16:48Z","2015-05","2015-04-16","2015-5"],"dc:description":["This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2015-07-22 without embargo terms","The student, Jennifer Nichol, accepted the attached license on 2015-04-14 at 19:36.","The student, Jennifer Nichol, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2015-04-14 at 19:42.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2015-04-16 at 09:00.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #7861 on 2015-07-22 at 10:32:03","Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T22:16:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 NICHOL-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf: 744782 bytes, checksum: 9ece162a58d27f537253a848c13b138b (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4212 bytes, checksum: 253ba4149aa426bdae3c169c1a5b19fd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-16"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/78388"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2015 Jennifer Nichol"],"dc:subject":["Contract framing","Misreporting"],"dc:title":["The effects of contract framing on misconduct"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Accountancy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:11Z"}