{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/71555"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/71555","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Materialism and Mental Attribution","abstract":"This dissertation argues that contemporary materialism constitutes a viable position between dualism on the one hand and so-called analytical behaviorism on the other hand only if it can hold both that sentences containing mental terms are standardly used to talk about 'inner' processes, states, etc., and that these 'inner' processes, etc., are material in nature. It maintains that contemporary materialism cannot consistently hold both these claims. The basic argument is that if sentences containing mental terms are construed as being used to talk about 'inner' processes, etc., then first person phenomenological attributions have to be construed as reports. But, it is argued, that such attributions cannot be construed as reports without being committed to the existence of phenomenological states. Finally, it is argued that commitment to the existence of phenomenological states is incompatible with commitment to materialism.","abstract_html":"This dissertation argues that contemporary materialism constitutes a viable position between dualism on the one hand and so-called analytical behaviorism on the other hand only if it can hold both that sentences containing mental terms are standardly used to talk about 'inner' processes, states, etc., and that these 'inner' processes, etc., are material in nature. It maintains that contemporary materialism cannot consistently hold both these claims. The basic argument is that if sentences containing mental terms are construed as being used to talk about 'inner' processes, etc., then first person phenomenological attributions have to be construed as reports. But, it is argued, that such attributions cannot be construed as reports without being committed to the existence of phenomenological states. 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It maintains that contemporary materialism cannot consistently hold both these claims. The basic argument is that if sentences containing mental terms are construed as being used to talk about 'inner' processes, etc., then first person phenomenological attributions have to be construed as reports. But, it is argued, that such attributions cannot be construed as reports without being committed to the existence of phenomenological states. Finally, it is argued that commitment to the existence of phenomenological states is incompatible with commitment to materialism.","Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-16T18:48:03Z (GMT). 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It maintains that contemporary materialism cannot consistently hold both these claims. The basic argument is that if sentences containing mental terms are construed as being used to talk about 'inner' processes, etc., then first person phenomenological attributions have to be construed as reports. But, it is argued, that such attributions cannot be construed as reports without being committed to the existence of phenomenological states. Finally, it is argued that commitment to the existence of phenomenological states is incompatible with commitment to materialism.","Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-16T18:48:03Z (GMT). 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