{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/70780"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/70780","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Firm Strategy and Research and Development: A Game Theoretic Approach","abstract":"The research and development decision pivots on many important variables--some beyond the control of the decision maker. One of these variables is the presence or absence of patent protection. The possibility of imitation adds additional uncertainty into the decision. The riskiness of the project may have an impact on the way that this uncertainty is resolved.","abstract_html":"The research and development decision pivots on many important variables--some beyond the control of the decision maker. One of these variables is the presence or absence of patent protection. The possibility of imitation adds additional uncertainty into the decision. The riskiness of the project may have an impact on the way that this uncertainty is resolved.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Duffus, Lu Ann Mcclernan"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-12-16T04:05:16Z","date_published":"2014-12-16T04:05:16Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:03Z","subjects":["Economics, Theory"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["(UMI)AAI8701477"],"render_values":[{"text":"(UMI)AAI8701477","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/70780","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Duffus, Lu Ann Mcclernan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-12-16T04:05:16Z","10000-01-01","1986"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics, Theory"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/70780","(UMI)AAI8701477"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The research and development decision pivots on many important variables--some beyond the control of the decision maker. One of these variables is the presence or absence of patent protection. The possibility of imitation adds additional uncertainty into the decision. The riskiness of the project may have an impact on the way that this uncertainty is resolved.","The purpose of this dissertation is to consider a firm's research and development decision when patent protection, if it exists at all, is weak or ineffective. If one firm successfully innovates, a rival firm may imitate, although the imitation will be costly and the probability of imitation (within a finite planning horizon) is less than one. Of interest is the impact of imitation on the rate of expenditure on research and development and the risk implications for a risk neutral firm. A two firm differential game is used as the vehicle for firm interaction. Both dynamic programming and calculus of variations are used to investigate the firm's optimal research and development decision.","Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-16T04:05:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 8701477.pdf: 2899961 bytes, checksum: 4156851bf9e687c15fb6572a314a7c7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1986","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 70946 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","95 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Firm Strategy and Research and Development: A Game Theoretic Approach"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Duffus, Lu Ann Mcclernan"],"dc:date":["2014-12-16T04:05:16Z","10000-01-01","1986"],"dc:description":["The research and development decision pivots on many important variables--some beyond the control of the decision maker. One of these variables is the presence or absence of patent protection. The possibility of imitation adds additional uncertainty into the decision. The riskiness of the project may have an impact on the way that this uncertainty is resolved.","The purpose of this dissertation is to consider a firm's research and development decision when patent protection, if it exists at all, is weak or ineffective. If one firm successfully innovates, a rival firm may imitate, although the imitation will be costly and the probability of imitation (within a finite planning horizon) is less than one. Of interest is the impact of imitation on the rate of expenditure on research and development and the risk implications for a risk neutral firm. A two firm differential game is used as the vehicle for firm interaction. Both dynamic programming and calculus of variations are used to investigate the firm's optimal research and development decision.","Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-16T04:05:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 8701477.pdf: 2899961 bytes, checksum: 4156851bf9e687c15fb6572a314a7c7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1986","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 70946 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs","U of I Only","95 p.","Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/70780","(UMI)AAI8701477"],"dc:subject":["Economics, Theory"],"dc:title":["Firm Strategy and Research and Development: A Game Theoretic Approach"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:26:03Z"}