{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/49747"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/49747","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Thesis on implementation under ambiguity","abstract":"The thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter one (with professor Nicholas Yannelis), we introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin). The interest on the maximin efficient notions lies in the fact that they are always incentive compatible (de Castro-Yannelis 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions, for example, maximin core and maximin value allocation. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity. In Chapter two, we provide a counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we show that a maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient, and therefore it may not be in the maximin core. Another consequence is that the implementation result of Chapter one cannot be applied to the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. Finally, in Chapter three, we show that each maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible. Also, we characterize the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. These findings contribute to the desirability of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium notion.","abstract_html":"The thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter one (with professor Nicholas Yannelis), we introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin). The interest on the maximin efficient notions lies in the fact that they are always incentive compatible (de Castro-Yannelis 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions, for example, maximin core and maximin value allocation. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity. In Chapter two, we provide a counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we show that a maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient, and therefore it may not be in the maximin core. Another consequence is that the implementation result of Chapter one cannot be applied to the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. Finally, in Chapter three, we show that each maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible. Also, we characterize the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. These findings contribute to the desirability of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium notion.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Liu, Zhiwei"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Polborn, Mattias K.","Yannelis, Nicholas C.","Villamil, Anne P.","Krasa, Stefan"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-05-30T17:07:40Z","date_published":"2014-05-30T17:07:40Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:40Z","subjects":["Maximin Preferences","Implementation","Maximin Equilibrium","Individually Rational and Maximin Efficient Notions","Maximin Rational Expectations Equilibrium"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2014 Zhiwei Liu"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49747","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Polborn, Mattias K.","Yannelis, Nicholas C.","Villamil, Anne P.","Krasa, Stefan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Liu, Zhiwei"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-05-30T17:07:40Z","2016-09-22T20:59:20Z","2014-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Maximin Preferences","Implementation","Maximin Equilibrium","Individually Rational and Maximin Efficient Notions","Maximin Rational Expectations Equilibrium"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2014 Zhiwei Liu"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49747"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter one (with professor Nicholas Yannelis), we introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin). The interest on the maximin efficient notions lies in the fact that they are always incentive compatible (de Castro-Yannelis 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions, for example, maximin core and maximin value allocation. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity. In Chapter two, we provide a counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we show that a maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient, and therefore it may not be in the maximin core. Another consequence is that the implementation result of Chapter one cannot be applied to the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. Finally, in Chapter three, we show that each maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible. Also, we characterize the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. These findings contribute to the desirability of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium notion.","Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2014-04-17T13:56:47Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liu_Zhiwei.pdf: 747769 bytes, checksum: 5b0af2fde0356abca681b172e855ce82 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-30T17:07:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Zhiwei_Liu.pdf: 747769 bytes, checksum: 5b0af2fde0356abca681b172e855ce82 (MD5) license.txt: 4058 bytes, checksum: 8325f3a299fe6cd85b942b0b4126c225 (MD5)","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (robbins.sd@gmail.com) on 2014-05-30T17:09:58Z Item is restricted until 2016-05-30T17:09:03Z","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:39:29-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2016-05-30 12:09:03 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 49798 on 2016-09-22T20:59:20Z."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Thesis on implementation under ambiguity"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Polborn, Mattias K.","Yannelis, Nicholas C.","Villamil, Anne P.","Krasa, Stefan"],"dc:creator":["Liu, Zhiwei"],"dc:date":["2014-05-30T17:07:40Z","2016-09-22T20:59:20Z","2014-05"],"dc:description":["The thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter one (with professor Nicholas Yannelis), we introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin). The interest on the maximin efficient notions lies in the fact that they are always incentive compatible (de Castro-Yannelis 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions, for example, maximin core and maximin value allocation. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex-ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity. In Chapter two, we provide a counterexample to the ex-ante efficiency of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we show that a maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation may not be ex-ante maximin efficient, and therefore it may not be in the maximin core. Another consequence is that the implementation result of Chapter one cannot be applied to the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. Finally, in Chapter three, we show that each maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation is maximin Nash incentive compatible. Also, we characterize the conditions, under which each maximin rational expectations equilibrium is implementable as a maximin equilibrium. These findings contribute to the desirability of the maximin rational expectations equilibrium notion.","Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2014-04-17T13:56:47Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Liu_Zhiwei.pdf: 747769 bytes, checksum: 5b0af2fde0356abca681b172e855ce82 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-30T17:07:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Zhiwei_Liu.pdf: 747769 bytes, checksum: 5b0af2fde0356abca681b172e855ce82 (MD5) license.txt: 4058 bytes, checksum: 8325f3a299fe6cd85b942b0b4126c225 (MD5)","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (robbins.sd@gmail.com) on 2014-05-30T17:09:58Z Item is restricted until 2016-05-30T17:09:03Z","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:39:29-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2016-05-30 12:09:03 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 49798 on 2016-09-22T20:59:20Z."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49747"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2014 Zhiwei Liu"],"dc:subject":["Maximin Preferences","Implementation","Maximin Equilibrium","Individually Rational and Maximin Efficient Notions","Maximin Rational Expectations Equilibrium"],"dc:title":["Thesis on implementation under ambiguity"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:40Z"}