{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/46818"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/46818","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"An implicit bias to generalize to categories: evidence from memory errors","abstract":"Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2013-11-22T20:01:48Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sutherland_Shelbie.pdf: 465684 bytes, checksum: 9e3218fbed69db8ebb178ed58f77e7d4 (MD5)","abstract_html":"Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2013-11-22T20:01:48Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sutherland_Shelbie.pdf: 465684 bytes, checksum: 9e3218fbed69db8ebb178ed58f77e7d4 (MD5)","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sutherland, Shelbie"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Cimpian, Andrei"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-01-16T18:17:11Z","date_published":"2014-01-16T18:17:11Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:36Z","subjects":["generic knowledge","concepts","kinds","quantifiers","memory"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2013 Shelbie Sutherland"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46818","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Cimpian, Andrei"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sutherland, Shelbie"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-01-16T18:17:11Z","2016-01-16T11:01:53Z","2013-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["generic knowledge","concepts","kinds","quantifiers","memory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2013 Shelbie Sutherland"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46818"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2013-11-22T20:01:48Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sutherland_Shelbie.pdf: 465684 bytes, checksum: 9e3218fbed69db8ebb178ed58f77e7d4 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2014-01-16T18:17:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Shelbie_Sutherland.pdf: 465711 bytes, checksum: 6f5cdd93aa6cff8fd819da25d9daf678 (MD5) license.txt: 4068 bytes, checksum: 482f13bc60b2e0f543a3d7e967768ee8 (MD5)","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:35:35-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2016-01-16 12:19:34 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","We propose that humans have an implicit bias to generalize information about the members of a category to the category itself, when appropriate. This proposal complements recent arguments that category- or kind-based reasoning is particularly low-effort and may thus be privileged in human cognition (e.g., Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012). To test our proposal, we asked participants to remember two types of novel facts: kind-wide (generic) facts (e.g., facts about zorbs) and universally quantified facts (e.g., facts about all stups). Half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that, due to the hypothesized bias, participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts about generalizable properties to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently than for the facts about idiosyncratic properties. In turn, these implicit generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory conversions for the generalizable properties. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable versus idiosyncratic difference occurred under cognitive load (Experiment 1), suggesting that the hypothesized bias requires few cognitive resources, and when controlling for potential differences across these two types of properties in the similarity/confusability of quantified and generic statements (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that these results were an artifact of the memory clues provided to participants. These studies provide evidence for our proposal of an implicit bias to draw generalizations about kinds.","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (robbins.sd@gmail.com) on 2014-01-16T18:19:40Z Item is restricted until 2016-01-16T18:19:34Z","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 46837 on 2016-01-16T11:01:53Z."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["An implicit bias to generalize to categories: evidence from memory errors"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Cimpian, Andrei"],"dc:creator":["Sutherland, Shelbie"],"dc:date":["2014-01-16T18:17:11Z","2016-01-16T11:01:53Z","2013-12"],"dc:description":["Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2013-11-22T20:01:48Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Sutherland_Shelbie.pdf: 465684 bytes, checksum: 9e3218fbed69db8ebb178ed58f77e7d4 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2014-01-16T18:17:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Shelbie_Sutherland.pdf: 465711 bytes, checksum: 6f5cdd93aa6cff8fd819da25d9daf678 (MD5) license.txt: 4068 bytes, checksum: 482f13bc60b2e0f543a3d7e967768ee8 (MD5)","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:35:35-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2016-01-16 12:19:34 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","We propose that humans have an implicit bias to generalize information about the members of a category to the category itself, when appropriate. This proposal complements recent arguments that category- or kind-based reasoning is particularly low-effort and may thus be privileged in human cognition (e.g., Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012). To test our proposal, we asked participants to remember two types of novel facts: kind-wide (generic) facts (e.g., facts about zorbs) and universally quantified facts (e.g., facts about all stups). Half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that, due to the hypothesized bias, participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts about generalizable properties to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently than for the facts about idiosyncratic properties. In turn, these implicit generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory conversions for the generalizable properties. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable versus idiosyncratic difference occurred under cognitive load (Experiment 1), suggesting that the hypothesized bias requires few cognitive resources, and when controlling for potential differences across these two types of properties in the similarity/confusability of quantified and generic statements (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that these results were an artifact of the memory clues provided to participants. These studies provide evidence for our proposal of an implicit bias to draw generalizations about kinds.","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (robbins.sd@gmail.com) on 2014-01-16T18:19:40Z Item is restricted until 2016-01-16T18:19:34Z","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 46837 on 2016-01-16T11:01:53Z."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/46818"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2013 Shelbie Sutherland"],"dc:subject":["generic knowledge","concepts","kinds","quantifiers","memory"],"dc:title":["An implicit bias to generalize to categories: evidence from memory errors"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:36Z"}