{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/45283"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/45283","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Risk penalties for enhanced reliability in co-optimized markets with uncertain generation","abstract":"With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper, we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability.","abstract_html":"With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper, we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kang, Kyoungwon"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Industrial Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Shanbhag, Vinayak V."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-08-22T16:34:38Z","date_published":"2013-08-22T16:34:38Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:34Z","subjects":["Wind power","Complementarity problem","Nash game","Variational inequality","Risk","Risk penalty","Power market"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 2013 Kyoungwon Kang"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/45283","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Shanbhag, Vinayak V."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kang, Kyoungwon"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2013-08-22T16:34:38Z","2018-12-20T10:15:09Z","2021-01-08T10:15:07Z","2023-01-11T06:00:00Z","2013-08"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Industrial Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Wind power","Complementarity problem","Nash game","Variational inequality","Risk","Risk penalty","Power market"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2013 Kyoungwon Kang"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/45283"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper, we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2013-07-15T19:16:53Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Kang_Kyoungwon.pdf: 1535429 bytes, checksum: e7dc5e45694547a07d96db2cfa5bce1b (MD5)","Author requested U of I Only Access for 2 years. Effective date 1/11/21. Approved by Thesis Office 1/8/21.","U of I Only"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Risk penalties for enhanced reliability in co-optimized markets with uncertain generation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Shanbhag, Vinayak V."],"dc:creator":["Kang, Kyoungwon"],"dc:date":["2013-08-22T16:34:38Z","2018-12-20T10:15:09Z","2021-01-08T10:15:07Z","2023-01-11T06:00:00Z","2013-08"],"dc:description":["With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper, we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2013-07-15T19:16:53Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Kang_Kyoungwon.pdf: 1535429 bytes, checksum: e7dc5e45694547a07d96db2cfa5bce1b (MD5)","Author requested U of I Only Access for 2 years. Effective date 1/11/21. Approved by Thesis Office 1/8/21.","U of I Only"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/45283"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2013 Kyoungwon Kang"],"dc:subject":["Wind power","Complementarity problem","Nash game","Variational inequality","Risk","Risk penalty","Power market"],"dc:title":["Risk penalties for enhanced reliability in co-optimized markets with uncertain generation"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Industrial Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:34Z"}