{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/42450"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/42450","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The effects of Conditional Cash Transfer programs on Latin American presidential elections","abstract":"In the late 1990s and 2000s, a new kind of social policy spread through Latin American countries. Nearly all of them currently invest in Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, i.e. programs that pay cash to poor families and impose health and education conditionalities on their children. Political scientists investigating the phenomenon commonly argue that these programs have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor, but these claims have been sustained by only a handful of country studies. In this dissertation, I pursue two objectives. First, I analyze an original dataset with information for all Latin American presidential elections carried out between 1990 and 2010 and show that investments in CCT programs have not had any significant effect on the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Second, I explore multiple sub-national and survey data to demonstrate that CCT programs are associated with both electoral gains among the poor and electoral losses among the rich. I claim that the occurrence of these counterbalancing effects explain why CCT programs have not helped incumbents to win elections. Their most important electoral consequence was to trigger rearrangements in the composition of incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing the participation of the poor and decreasing the participation of the rich.","abstract_html":"In the late 1990s and 2000s, a new kind of social policy spread through Latin American countries. Nearly all of them currently invest in Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, i.e. programs that pay cash to poor families and impose health and education conditionalities on their children. Political scientists investigating the phenomenon commonly argue that these programs have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor, but these claims have been sustained by only a handful of country studies. In this dissertation, I pursue two objectives. First, I analyze an original dataset with information for all Latin American presidential elections carried out between 1990 and 2010 and show that investments in CCT programs have not had any significant effect on the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Second, I explore multiple sub-national and survey data to demonstrate that CCT programs are associated with both electoral gains among the poor and electoral losses among the rich. I claim that the occurrence of these counterbalancing effects explain why CCT programs have not helped incumbents to win elections. Their most important electoral consequence was to trigger rearrangements in the composition of incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing the participation of the poor and decreasing the participation of the rich.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Correa, Diego"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Cheibub, José Antonio","Svolik, Milan","Winters, Matthew","Canache, Damarys J."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-02-03T19:46:03Z","date_published":"2013-02-03T19:46:03Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:33Z","subjects":["Latin America","Income Redistribution","Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs","Presidential Elections"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2012 Diego Correa"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/42450","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Cheibub, José Antonio","Svolik, Milan","Winters, Matthew","Canache, Damarys J."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Correa, Diego"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2013-02-03T19:46:03Z","2015-02-03T11:00:36Z","2012-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Latin America","Income Redistribution","Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs","Presidential Elections"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2012 Diego Correa"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/42450"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["In the late 1990s and 2000s, a new kind of social policy spread through Latin American countries. Nearly all of them currently invest in Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, i.e. programs that pay cash to poor families and impose health and education conditionalities on their children. Political scientists investigating the phenomenon commonly argue that these programs have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor, but these claims have been sustained by only a handful of country studies. In this dissertation, I pursue two objectives. First, I analyze an original dataset with information for all Latin American presidential elections carried out between 1990 and 2010 and show that investments in CCT programs have not had any significant effect on the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Second, I explore multiple sub-national and survey data to demonstrate that CCT programs are associated with both electoral gains among the poor and electoral losses among the rich. 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I claim that the occurrence of these counterbalancing effects explain why CCT programs have not helped incumbents to win elections. Their most important electoral consequence was to trigger rearrangements in the composition of incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing the participation of the poor and decreasing the participation of the rich.","Item withdrawn by Alexis Thompson (athmpsn1@illinois.edu) on 2012-12-03T19:16:51Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Correa_Diego.pdf: 2794946 bytes, checksum: 2ebd5db47a371668c172fb8c5bcb8c10 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2013-02-03T19:46:03Z (GMT). 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